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Abstract 
 
International trade is a key driver of development. This thesis contains 
three chapters concerned with the challenges of, and opportunities for, 
expanding international trade in developing countries.   
 
The first chapter, “Growth Spillovers and Market Access in Africa”, shows 
that because of increased trade, African countries benefit from the growth 
of their neighbours. In particular, growth in neighbouring countries 
increases the size of accessible markets, boosting export demand for local 
goods. Over the period 1992-2012, this expansion of markets increased 
domestic growth rates by over 2 percent per year on average. By reducing 
trade costs, countries can further increase these positive growth spillovers.  
 
The second chapter, “Bad Neighbours as Obstacles to Trade: Evidence 
from African Civil Wars”, considers how the trade of landlocked African 
countries is affected by neighbouring civil wars. The paper shows that such 
civil wars increase transport costs and subsequently reduce the 
international trade of landlocked countries. Calibrating the regression 
results, I estimate that landlocked trade could have been around 12 percent 
higher over the period 1975-2005 in the absence of neighbouring civil wars.  
 
The final chapter, “Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure: Theory 
and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions”, is joint work 
with Stephane Straub and Jean-Jacques Dethier. Large transport projects in 
developing countries are now often delivered through private concessions, 
and we analyse the financing of such projects. A common argument is that 
firms use leverage in order to influence regulatory outcomes. Intuitively, 
firms can extract higher prices by increasing leverage if regulators fear 
project collapse. We show that under price cap regulation, this mechanism 
is weakened because prices are less responsive to costs. Consistent with the 
theory, we find evidence that infrastructure firms in Latin America use less 
debt when regulated through price cap. 
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1 Growth spillovers and market access in Africa
Abstract
How much do countries in Africa benet from their neighboursgrowth,
and how can such benets be maximised? This paper shows that neigh-
bouring growth increases a countrys international market accessboost-
ing export demand and lowering prices. Using luminosity data to exploit
within-country variation, I show that international market access has con-
tributed over 2 percent per year on average to output growth over 1992-2012.
By reducing trade costs, countries can increase their international market
access, and so increase the spillover of neighbouring growth into domestic
growth. Based on the results presented here, we can therefore quantify the
expected impact of particular policies on output and growth. I show for
example that an expanded West African currency union could increase the
aggregate output of the a¤ected countries by around 40 percent.1
1I am grateful to my supervisor Tim Besley for continued advice and support. I also
thank Jane Ansell, Zelda Brutti, Vernon Henderson, Guy Michaels, Adam Storeygard,
Silvana Tenreyro and seminar participants at LSE for very helpful feedback.
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1.1 Introduction
With African growth averaging over 4 percent a year since the early 1990s,
there is increasing hope that much of the continent may have nally achieved
growth take-o¤.2 The incidence of civil war has declined by most measures,
and some post-conict countries such as Mozambique and Rwanda have
achieved steady and sustained economic progress.3 The image of Africa
as a bad neighbourhoodlooks increasingly inaccurate. Indeed, for many
countries, the prosperity of their surrounding neighbourhood has increased
markedly.
In this paper, I ask to what extent African countries benet from the
growth of their neighbours, and how such benets can be maximised. I focus
on a specic channel: trade. I present a trade model in which domestic
regions benet from their neighboursgrowth, as access to foreign markets
increases. This boosts export demand and lowers prices, increasing the
regions output. To test the predictions of the model, I use luminosity data
to create a balanced panel of sub-national regional output over 1992-2012. I
calculate each regions international market access(IMA), and investigate
to what extent increases in IMA are associated with increases in domestic
output.4
Following the model, IMA is calculated as a weighted sum of the out-
put in all foreign regions, with weights determined by the cost of trade
and the elasticity of trade with respect to (w.r.t.) trade costs. As actual
trade costs are unobserved, I rst estimate a cross-country gravity model
to provide reasonable values for the trade cost parameters. As in much of
2Throughout the paper, I use "Africa" to refer to Sub-Saharan Africa. The average
growth of real GDP in Africa was 4.1% over 1992-2012, based on World Bank gures.
3Based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Database for example, there were 7
Sub-Saharan African countries involved in "intense" conicts - those resulting in at least
1,000 deaths per year - in 1990. By 2012, this dropped to just two (Somalia and Sudan).
See also http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2013/11/civil-wars
4Throughout, I use "region" to refer to the sub-national Admin level 1 regions. Sum-
mary statistics are provided on the regions in Table 2. There are on average 13 regions
per country, with a minimum of 3 in Swaziland and a maximum of 40 in Burkina Faso.
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the gravity literature, I nd that trade declines signicantly with distance
and international borders, but increases when there is a common language,
currency union or free trade agreement (see Head and Mayer 2015 for a
meta-analysis). Feeding the gravity estimates into my market access term,
I nd that increases in IMA are associated with signicant increases in
domestic output, with an elasticity in the range 0.7 to 0.9.
To put this into context, changes in IMA alone imply average regional
output growth of over 2 percent per year over the period. This is a sub-
stantial gure, and is at odds with previous work that has found growth
spilloversto be small in Africa (World Bank 2009, Roberts and Deichmann
2011). Instead, the evidence here shows that African countries have benet-
ted signicantly from the growth of their neighbours. This is supported by
an emerging economic geography literature, demonstrating the importance
of access to markets for an areas prosperity (Hanson 2005). Perhaps the
most closely related paper to mine is that of Redding and Venables (2004),
who show that foreign market accessis an important determinant of inter-
national inequality. As in this paper, the authors estimate a gravity model
to derive estimates of market access, which they then regress on income
per capita in a cross-section of countries.5 Their results suggest that for-
eign market access alone can explain around 35 percent of the cross-country
variation in GDP per capita.
The novel contribution of this paper is to exploit within-country varia-
tion. This is done through panel regressions of output (luminosity) on FMA
at the region level, including both region and country-year xed e¤ects. The
region xed e¤ects eliminate institutional and geographic factors, such as
the disease environment, that could drive a spurious correlation between
output and market access. The country-year xed e¤ects absorb political
and macroeconomic shocks, which have often been so large in Africa as to
5The empirical approach of Redding & Venables (2004) is somewhat di¤erent, calcu-
lating market access based on the xed e¤ect coe¢ cients from the initial gravity regres-
sion. The theoretical approach is also di¤erent, leading them to use GDP per capita as
the dependent variable. Mayer (2009) extends their methodology to a panel of countries.
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dwarf other sources of output variation.6 These idiosyncratic shocks make
it very di¢ cult to identify and estimate growth spillovers at the country-
level. Instead, the strategy here is to ask whether those regions within a
country that have cheaper access to foreign African markets respond more
to output changes in those markets than regions within the same country
that have more costly access.
The analysis is particularly relevant to Africa, a continent of histori-
cally low growth and still home to the majority of the worlds very poorest
countries. With a third of the population being landlocked, and manufac-
turing centres continuing to agglomerate in East Asia, penetrating global
markets may be unrealistic in the near-term (Radelet & Sachs 1998, Col-
lier 2008). As a result, African economic integration is now a top priority
of donors and policy makers. The African Development Bank for example
has a dedicated Regional Integration & Trade Division, and in November
2014 approved a new Regional Integration Policy and Strategy for 2014-
2023.7 For the landlocked in particular, Collier and OConnell (2007) argue
that "the most obvious growth strategy for such a country is to service the
markets of its neighbours" (p.38).
The results here show that reducing trade costs enables a country to
pursue such a growth strategy. In particular, reducing trade costs increases
IMA and so increases the spillover of neighbouring growth into domestic
growth. Based on the gravity results, I can quantify the extent to which
specic policies will increase IMA, and so ultimately estimate the impact
of such policies on output and growth. To demonstrate this, I consider a
specic policy currently under review: an extension of the West African
6Over the period studied for example, the coe¢ cient of variation (the standard devi-
ation divided by the mean) of real GDP was 0.27 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 0.18 globally
and 0.13 in the OECD (based on World Bank WDI gures). Further, 7 Sub-Saharan
African countries witnessed a swing in real GDP of over 25 percent from one year to the
next at some point during the period.
7The President of the Bank recently listed his top priorities for the continent as
(i) integration, (ii) institutions and (iii) infrastructure (Financing Africas Future: In-
frastructure, Investment and Opportunity", speech at LSE on 23rd September 2014).
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currency union to include six additional countries. I estimate that such a
policy could increase aggregate West African output by around 40 percent,
with substantially larger gains for non-members of the existing currency
union. Quantifying the (trade-related) gains from such policies can assist
policy makers in evaluating expected gains against potential losses (for the
currency union case see Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2010 for a discussion).
Figure 1.1 demonstrates the variation in IMA, and its growth, over the
period. The regions bordering South Africa and Nigeria benet from the
highest levels of IMA (left-hand map), although growth has been strongest
in the far western regions (right-hand map). As a calibration exercise, I
document the importance of South Africa and Nigeria together accounting
for half of African GDP to their immediate neighbours. Due to its impact
on IMA, I nd that each additional percentage point of growth in South
Africa is reected in at least half a percentage point of growth in each
of its neighbours. Nigerias inuence is smaller, due to its higher trade
costs, although even here each neighbour would benet from at least a
quarter of a percentage point of additional growth. By lowering trade costs,
neighbouring countries can increase their access to these large markets and
increase such growth spillovers.
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Figure 1.1: International Market Access (IMA),
Level (1992) and Growth (1992-2012)
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents the trade model that
derives domestic output as a function of market access. Building on this,
Section 1.3 presents the empirical framework which proceeds in two stages.
First, a gravity model is used to estimate the IMA term. Second, regional
output is regressed on this market access term, generating my main results
of interest. Section 1.4 discusses the data, in particular the luminosity
data and construction of regional output. Section 1.5 presents the results
and Section 1.6 considers the growth and policy implications. Section 1.7
concludes.
1.2 Theory
To guide the empirical analysis, I present a trade model based on Eaton
and Kortum (2002) and Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013), that derives the
output of every region i as a log-linear function of its "market access".
Market access is a weighted sum of the output in all other regions, where
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each region j is weighted by the level of competition for that region, the
cost of trading with region i and the elasticity of trade w.r.t. trade costs.
There are many regions, indexed by i when the origin of an export and
j when the destination. Regions produce a continuum of goods (indexed
by s) using a Cobb-Douglas technology with labour and capital as inputs.
The marginal cost of producing a good of variety s in region i is given by:
MCi(s) =
wi r
1 
zi(s)
(1)
where wi is the wage rate, r is the capital rental rate and zi(s) is the
e¢ ciency with which region i can produce variety s.8 Following Eaton and
Kortum (2002), e¢ ciency zi(s) is stochastic, and drawn from an extreme
value distribution given by Fi(z) = e Tiz
 
with Ti > 0 and  > 1. The
parameter Ti increases the mean of the distribution, meaning that Ti can be
interpreted as region is level of technology (as average e¢ ciency is higher).
A lower  increases the variability of the distribution, such that i will be
more e¢ cient in the production of some goods than others. As noted by
Eaton and Kortum, Ti is therefore a source of absolute advantage for region
i, and  is a source of comparative advantage.
If labour is mobile, utility levels must be constant across regions in
equilibrium:
U =
wi
Pi
(2)
where U is the constant level of utility across regions and Pi is the
consumer price index in region i.9 Crucially, trading goods across regions
is costly. Modelling trade costs using the standard iceberg approach, the
price of a good produced in region i and sold in region j is given by pij(s) =
 ijpii(s) where  ij  1 is the trade cost and pii(s) is the price of the good
sold locally. Region i supplies j with good s if it is the lowest cost supplier,
8Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile, implying a common rental rate r.
9This assumption is discussed in detail below.
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and so in general, j sources all its goods from the regions from which it can
achieve the lowest price.
The expression for the overall price index Pi in region i is solved explic-
itly in Eaton and Kortum (2002), and is given by:
P i = a1
X
j
Tjw
 
j 
 
ij (3)
where a1 is a constant. Following Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013), this
expression can be termed "consumer market access" (CMA), as it captures
the access of consumers in i to goods produced elsewhere, with prices in i
increasing in the trade cost  ij. A further expression derived explicitly in
Eaton and Kortum (2002) is a gravity equation giving the value of exports
(Xij) from i to j:
Xij = a2Tiw
 
i 
 
ij P

j Yj (4)
where a2 is a constant and Yj is the income of region j. Intuitively,
i supplies j with the goods for which it is the lowest cost supplier. The
likelihood of being this low cost supplier increases in is level of technology
Ti and the overall price level Pj (where a higher price level corresponds to
less competition for market j). Higher income Yj boosts the overall level
of demand coming from j. The opposing force is the trade cost  ij, which
reduces is competitiveness in region j. It can also be seen in (4) that 
captures the elasticity of trade w.r.t. trade costs. This is consistent with
the earlier interpretation of  as the source of comparative advantage: as
comparative advantage weakens (higher ), the importance of geographic
barriers increases.10
As an accounting identity, the output Yi of region i is the sum of its
10Technically, a higher  reduces the likelihood of outliers in the e¢ ciency distribution
Fi(z) that enable i to produce good s cheaply enough to overcome geographic obstacles
captured by  ij .
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exports to all regions j,
Yi =
X
j
Xij (5)
where
P
j Xij includes Xii (i.e. local consumption). Substituting for
Xij from the gravity equation (4), and replacing Pj and wi from (3) and
(2) respectively, we can derive an expression for the output of region i as a
weighted product of the output of all regions j:
Yi = a2TiU
 
P i
X
j
 ij CMA
 1
j Yj (6)
where
P
j 
 
ij CMA
 1
j Yj is the "rm market access" (FMA) of region
i. This expression shows that the output of region i is increasing in its
access to the markets of all regions j: other things equal, output is higher
in regions with cheap access ( ij ) to large markets (Yj) that have limited
sources of cheap supply from elsewhere (CMA 1j ). To see this explicitly,
we can take logs of equation (6) to arrive at:
ln(Yi) = a3 + ln(Ti) +  ln(CMAi) + ln(FMAi) (7)
where a3 is just a constant given by ln(a2)  ln(U) and I use the result
that P i  CMAi.
Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) show that as FMAi =
P
j 
 
ij CMA
 1
j Yj
and CMAj =
P
i 
 
ij FMA
 1
i Yi, any solution to these two equations must
satisfy FMAi = CMAi. That is, the two measures of market access are
in fact the same. Substituting this into equation (7), we get a model for
the output of region i as a simple log-linear function of its market access
(MAi):
ln(Yi) = a3 + ln(Ti) + (1 + ) ln(MAi) (8)
where MAi =
P
j
 ij Yj
MAj
.
Equation (8) states that controlling for a regions level of technology Ti,
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output increases log-linearly in market access. Market access is the sum of
output in all regions j, each Yj being weighted by (i) the cost of trading
with i, and (ii) js own market access MAj. This second term captures
the degree of competition for market j: if j itself has strong market access,
then a smaller share of its imports are sourced from i and hence increases in
import demand (coming from increases in Yj) are muted. Given a panel of
observations on regional output, equation (8) therefore provides a testable
prediction for the empirical analysis.
1.2.1 Discussion: Mobile labour
The assumption of mobile labour may seem strong in the context of an
international trade model. It is used here only to simplify the derivations
however; Alder (2015) works with the same underlying model, except that
he assumes immobile labour, and notes that "both versions of the model
lead to a log-linear relationship between income and market access. The
di¤erence is the predicted elasticity, but this is estimated from the data"
(p.22). In this paper I also estimate the predicted elasticity from the data,
and use the model for its qualitative prediction of a log-linear relationship
between output and market access. Hence the assumption of mobile labour
does not a¤ect the empirical approach that follows.
Unlike Alder (2015) and Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) however, both
of which work in the context of intra-country trade, this paper is primarily
interested in inter-country trade. In the model and the empirical work,
intra-country dynamics are ultimately overlooked. (The model itself does
not distinguish between domestic and foreign regions, although when it is
adapted for the empirical framework, domestic regions are omitted in the
calculation of market access.) The paper considers the relative response of
domestic regions to changes in their IMA; if there is a shock to a particular
regions IMA however, there may be subsequent domestic dynamics, such
as migration to/from the a¤ected region, that are not being captured.
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To capture these dynamics completely, a mixed regional/international
model would be required. Although that exercise is not undertaken here,
it is useful to think through the implications qualitatively. Suppose a par-
ticular region receives a boost to its IMA due to growth in a nearby region
across the border. This not only increases export demand, it also reduces
the domestic regions price index; an increase in foreign output Yj works
in the same direction as a fall in trade costs.11 This fall in the price level
temporarily increases the real wage, leading to in-migration. (It is assumed
that workers move wherever the real wage is highest, hence the need for a
constant real wage in equilibrium.) As the regions workforce increases how-
ever, the nominal wage falls due to diminishing returns to labour. Migration
therefore restores the domestic equilibrium, but the region that received the
initial (positive) IMA shock received an additional output boost due to in-
ternal migration.12 If I was to model internal dynamics explicitly, it is
therefore likely that it would reinforce the predictions of the model above.
In particular, even if I were to assume immobile labour between domestic
and foreign regions, but mobile labour between domestic regions, the model
should still predict a positive relationship between output and IMA.
1.3 Empirical Framework
The model has a strong intuitive appeal: higher market access attracts both
rms - seeking cheap access to sources of demand - and consumers - seeking
cheap access to goods. To implement the model empirically however, there
are a number of challenges. Firstly, the market access term from equa-
tion (8) includes domestic output, as it is a weighted sum of the output
in all regions j. This creates a clear endogeneity problem, and would re-
11From equation (3), the price index (Pi) is inversely proportional to consumer market
access. A fall in trade costs and an increase in foreign output both increase consumer
market access, and hence reduce the price index
12See Overman et al. (2010) for a more detailed discussion of the spatial implications
of an output shock in a particular region.
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quire estimates of internal trade costs  ii in order to be implemented. A
partial solution to the problem, pursued by Redding and Venables (2004)
and Mayer (2009), is to estimate internal trade costs and run the model
with both "domestic" and "foreign" market access terms. An alternative
approach, also pursued by Mayer (2009) and by Donaldson and Hornbeck
(2013), is to drop the inclusion of domestic output from the market access
term.13 As I am interested in international spillovers, this is the approach
I follow here. Indeed, to concentrate on international spillovers, I include
only foreign regions in the calculation of MAi. I term this "international
market access" and denote it by IMAi.14
Secondly, equation (8) remains an implicit function of Yi even when
domestic regions are excluded from the calculation of market access. This
is due to theMAj term in the denominator, which accounts for the degree of
competition for the importing region j. Following Donaldson and Hornbeck
(2013), I therefore approximate the theoretically correct market access term
with a simpler expression given by MAi =
P
j 
 
ij Yj. As noted by the
authors, the two market access terms are highly correlated in practice but
the approximation does not require each market access term to be explicitly
derived from the model.15 As I work with international market access, my
13Redding and Venables (2004) outline a similar trade model to the one presented
here but with immobile labour. Their model derives the wage rate in country i (wi) as
a log-linear function of the countrys market access. They use income per capita as a
proxy for wi and consider various approximations to calculate internal trade costs  ii
for the (domestic) market access term. Mayer (2009) extends the Redding and Venables
approach to a panel setting. He presents empirical results both with approximations for
 ii, and with domestic output dropped from the market access term. Both approaches
show strongly signicant e¤ects of market access on domestic income per capita.
14This is consistent with my approach of using cross-country gravity regressions to
estimate the trade cost function (below), and I show in robustness checks that my results
also hold when domestic regions are included in the market access term.
15That is, each MAi term could be derived from MAi =
P
j
 ij Yj
MAj
as this is a system
of J unknowns in J equations (taking the  ij terms as given, and where J denotes
the number of regions). Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) nd that the results from the
approximation adopted in this paper are almost identical to those implemented using
the full structural model (columns 1 and 2 in their Table 2).
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variable of interest is therefore given by IMAi =
P
j2F
 ij Yj
MAj
Pj2F  ij Yj,
where F denotes the set of foreign regions.
Allowing for randomness in the data and adding a time dimension, equa-
tion (8) therefore suggests the following specication:
ln(Yit) = '0 + '1 ln(IMAit) + i + ct + it (9)
where '0 is a constant, Yit is the output of region i in year t, IMAit =P
j2F 
 
ij Yjt, i and ct are region and country-year xed e¤ects respectively
(to control for the productivity Ti of region i) and it is an error term.
Without information on trade costs  ij and the elasticity of trade w.r.t.
trade costs (), equation (9) cannot be estimated directly. As an initial
step in the empirical work, and departing from Donaldson and Hornbeck
(2013), I therefore apply a gravity model to estimate these values.16 To
generate my main results of interest, I then regress regional output Yit on
the estimated market access term [IMAit.
1.3.1 Gravity: constructing [IMAit
As noted by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), the trade cost  ij is typi-
cally assumed to be multiplicatively separable in its factors, such that:
 ij =
MY
m=1
(zmij )
m (10)
where zij =

z1ij ::: z
m
ij ::: z
M
ij

is the vector of trade cost factors
between i and j (e.g. distance, shared language) and m is the elasticity
of  ij w.r.t. factor m. Substituting this expression into the international
16For the trade cost  ij Donaldson and Hornbeck use historical transport cost estimates
from the United States. They then apply a value of 3.8 to the trade elasticity . I do
not have inter-regional transport cost estimates for Sub-Saharan Africa, and also wish
to include additional trade costs such as language and border costs.
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market access term, we have:
IMAi =
X
j2F
"
MY
m=1
(zmij )
 m
#
Yj (11)
and from the gravity equation (4) we can get consistent estimates of the
m terms by running the following regression:
17
ln(Xij) = 0    ln( ij) + i + j + ij (12)
= 0  
X
m
m ln(z
m
ij ) + i + j + ij
where 0 is a constant and ij is the error term. That is, if we observed
trade ows between i and j; we could consistently estimate international
market access. Although I do not have regional trade data, I can estimate
(12) at the country level. A single year of trade data would su¢ ce for consis-
tency, however I include the full set of trade observations over 1992-2012 for
greater e¢ ciency. As trade cost factors (zij) I include distance, a contiguity
dummy, common language dummy, regional trade agreement (RTA) and
currency union (CU) dummies (Mayer 2009, Head and Mayer 2015). The
estimated coe¢ cients allow me to construct international market access as:
[IMAit =
X
j2F
"
MY
m=1
(zmij )
 dm
#
Yjt (13)
where the dm terms are the estimated coe¢ cients from (12).
Taking a simple example to clarify this procedure, suppose that the
only relevant trade cost is the distance between i and j. In this case, we
have  ij = dist

ij from equation (10) and ln(Xij) = 0    ln(distij) +
i + j + ij from the gravity equation (12). Suppose that from the gravity
equation we estimate c =  1:1, the mean estimate from Head and Mayer
17The exporter and importer xed e¤ects i and j control for the ln(Ti),  ln(UPi),
 ln(Pj) and ln(Yj) terms.
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(2015). Then from equation (13) the market access term would be given by
[IMAit =
P
j2F dist
 1:1
ij Yjt. This example highlights that the market access
term used here is a more general form of the well-known Harris (1954)
"market potential" term given by MPit =
P
j
Yjt
distij
.
1.3.2 Regional output and market access
Having constructed my market access term, I can turn to my primary ques-
tion of interest: how do changes in international market access a¤ect do-
mestic (regional) output? To do so, I run the following regression based on
(9):
ln(Yit) = 0 + 1 ln([IMAit) + i + ct + "it (14)
where [IMAit is from (13). In alternate specications I will also include
a region-specic linear time trend, to allow for di¤erent growth paths of the
regions.
1.3.3 Discussion: Empirical Strategy
To clarify the empirical strategy, equation (14) is the main regression of
interest, and is estimated across a panel of sub-national regions over 1992-
2012. In order to estimate (14) however, we require estimates of the elastic-
ity of trade w.r.t. trade costs () to create the [IMAit term. In the absence
of region-level trade data,  is therefore estimated by a gravity regression
at the country level - given by equation (12).
[IMAit is the sum of output in all foreign regions, with each region
weighted by the cost of trade with the domestic region. The cost of trade
is assumed to be xed, and so changes in [IMAit are driven exclusively by
changes in foreign output. Critically however, an output change in a foreign
region has more impact on the IMA of domestic regions with which it has
lower trade costs (because IMA is a weighted sum of foreign output). The
identication strategy is therefore to test whether those regions within a
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country that have cheaper access to foreign African markets respond more
to output changes in those markets than regions within the same country
that have more costly access.
To implement this strategy, equation (14) includes both region and
country-year xed e¤ects. The region xed e¤ects control for time-invariant
factors that could induce a spurious correlation between market access and
regional output in the cross-section. In Africa, prominent among such fac-
tors are the disease environment and physical geography. The country-year
xed e¤ects control for political and macroeconomic shocks. Such shocks
have been frequent and severe in Africa in the recent past: during the period
studied for example, 7 African countries witnessed a swing in real GDP of
over 25 percent from the previous year. In the presence of these dramatic
macro shocks, it is di¢ cult to identify international growth correlations or
spillovers when working with country-level data. Zimbabwe is a notable ex-
ample: between 2002 and 2008, it su¤ered an overall decline in real GDP of
31 percent, whilst each of its neighbours posted positive growth rates each
year. This does not mean that Zimbabwe did not benet from its neigh-
boursgrowth, rather that the domestic macro policies were so disastrous as
to completely o¤set such benets. Analysing regions within countries there-
fore allows for a cleaner identication of growth spillovers across countries
by controlling for these political and macro shocks.
A limitation of the approach however is that African GDP (and therefore
market access) has been growing over time, and so other factors that are
also growing over time could drive a correlation between market access and
output. The country-year xed e¤ects control for those factors that a¤ect
all regions within the country equally, but there may be some omitted
factors for which this is not the case. It is possible for example that lights
have been gradually spreading from major cities to hinterland regions that
have lower market access. Relative to the major cities, hinterland regions
would then have both a larger increase in their lights output and a larger
increase in their market access (as, being closer to a border, their market
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access is more heavily inuenced by other hinterland regions just across the
border). Although it is not possible to control for such issues completely, it
is noted that lights did not grow signicantly faster on average in hinterland
regions than capital regions over the period considered here.18 Henderson
et al. (2012) nd a slightly higher increase in lights growth in hinterland
areas of Africa than large cities, although they note that such a di¤erence
is extremely small. My preferred set of results also include region-specic
time trends, so that I am testing to what extent a regions lights output
deviates from trend in response to changes in market access.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Bilateral trade ows
I construct a panel of bilateral imports using data from the UN Comtrade
Database.19 The dependent variable is the value of imports of country i
from country j in year t. The independent variables - the distance between
countries i and j (denoted distij, measured in km), contiguity (denoted
border), language, CU and RTA dummies - are all taken from the gravity
database of Head et al. (2010), available at http://www.cepii.fr/.
1.4.2 Lights data
I exploit luminosity data to create a balanced panel of sub-national regional
output over 1992-2012. Described in detail in Henderson et al. (2012), night
time light readings have been recorded by the U.S. Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program (DMSP) since the 1960s, with a public digital archive
beginning in 1992. Before being publicly released, the data are processed to
remove most natural sources of light, including moonlight, sunlight, auroral
18I denote a "capital region" here as the largest region in each country based on lights
output in 2000. Lights output grew in capital regions by 5 percent per year on average.
In all other regions, they grew by 4 percent per year on average.
19I work with import reports as these are known to be more reliable than export
reports (World Trade Organization 2012).
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activity and forest res. The remaining lights are largely articial, reecting
the use of energy for both consumption and investment purposes. Lights
data therefore enable economic activity to be tracked at a local level, where
o¢ cial statistics are either unreliable or non-existent.
Light intensity is provided at the pixel-level, with each 30-arcsecond
pixel given an integer light reading between 0 and 63.20 Constraining light
readings to fall within this range reects the available sensor technology, and
in the African case many pixel-year observations omit no recorded light (an
issue known as "bottom coding"). There is likely in practice to be some
limited activity in such areas, not generating enough light to be captured by
the sensors. To check that this is not a¤ecting the main results, I show in
the Appendix that the results are robust to restricting the sample to areas
that have recorded light readings in every year, as well as dropping 1992
from the sample.21 Following standard practice (Henderson et al. 2012,
Storeygard 2014), I calculate a simple average of light readings for years in
which there is more than one satellite. Doing so provides a pixel-year panel
of light readings for the entire continent.
As the pixels are so small, I need to aggregate them into economically-
meaningful units. I aggregate to administrative level 1 regional units (herein
"Admin 1 regions"), with GIS boundaries provided by Natural Earth. Fig-
ure A1 in the Appendix provides a map of the regional boundaries. The
use of Admin 1 regions provides adequate within-country variation, whilst
ensuring that the model remains plausible and tractable.
Prior to aggregating, I clean the raw lights data by making use of the "ur-
ban extents" dataset provided by the Global Rural Urban Mapping Project
(GRUMP).22 The GRUMP dataset classies the globe into areas of "urban"
20A 30-arcsecond pixel has an area of approx. 0.86 square km at the equator.
21There is an abnormally large proportion of observations with a light reading of zero
in 1992. Thirty percent of regions have a light reading of zero in 1992, dropping to 20
percent in 1993 and falling gradually to 7 percent by 2012.
22Center for International Earth Science Information Network - CIESIN - Columbia
University, International Food Policy Research Institute - IFPRI, The World
Bank, and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical - CIAT (2011), Global
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and "rural", also at a spatial resolution of 30-arcseconds. The classication
of an urban area is based on population estimates; contiguous urban ar-
eas should consist of at least 5,000 persons.23 In aggregating to Admin 1
regions, I sum only across lights in urban areas. Doing so enables me to
include only areas where people actually live and economic activity takes
place, excluding extremely small settlements and random noise in the data
(such as lights from gas ares and lights that spill across borders).24 A
further advantage is that I can always classify contiguous urban cells, es-
sentially the same city, as belonging to the same region.25
Lights and economic output
As discussed in Pinkovsky (2013), a number of empirical papers have now
used luminosity data as a proxy for output. The rst paper to investigate
this relationship systematically was Henderson et al. (2012), who demon-
strated a robust correlation between luminosity readings and o¢ cial GDP
estimates in a panel of countries. The authors show that this relationship
holds both with and without a country time-trend, and also when esti-
mated in "long di¤erences". Their baseline results suggest an elasticity of
real GDP w.r.t. lights of around 0.3.
Rural-Urban Mapping Project, Version 1 (GRUMPv1): Urban Extents Grid.
Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC).
http://dx.doi.org/10.7927/H4GH9FVG accessed 28/10/2014. See also Balk et al (2006).
23CIESIN also provide a "settlement points" dataset, which provides coordinates of
known settlements of over 1,000 persons. Each urban extent should therefore correspond
to at least one settlement point (due to the higher populaton threshold). I drop any
contiguous urban extent pixels that do not have a settlement point associated with
them. This also ensures that any foreign urban areas that spill across the border are not
(incorrectly) included in a domestic region.
24Indeed, my approach shows a substantial and signicant correlation between the
regional lights data and o¢ cial GDP estimates on the South African sub-sample below.
Simply aggregating across lights within regions does not (even nearly) pass this "sense
check".
25I take the centroid of each contiguous block and assign the region according to the
location of the centroid. The advantage of this approach is that a "city", an economic
unit, is not split into two if its lights cross an Admin boundary.
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The principal advantage of using lights is that they enable estimates of
economic activity in local areas for which o¢ cial gures are unavailable.
In Africa, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) use luminosity data as a
proxy for income per capita across ethnic territories. To justify this, they
rst show that across di¤erent "enumeration areas" (typically villages or
small towns), lights output is highly correlated with a wealth index created
using Demographic and Health Surveys data. More recently, Storeygard
(2014) uses lights output as a measure of city-level output across a number
of African countries. He tests that light output approximates o¢ cial GDP
at the sub-national level by running regressions of GDP on luminosity for
Chinese prefectures (over 1992-2005) and South African magisterial districts
(over 1996-2001). The relationship is highly signicant in both cases, with
elasticities in the range 0.2 to 0.3.
Following these previous papers, I also test to what extent the luminosity
data used here correlates with o¢ cial GDP gures. Figure A2 provides a
visual illustration, plotting the light output of Rwanda - a country that has
grown steadily since the late-1990s, and Zimbabwe - a country where output
has declined slightly over the period.26 The contrast is clear from the lights
output, with growth in Rwanda notable in all areas of the country. To check
the correlation between GDP and lights explicitly, I sum the regional lights
gures above within each country, and run the following regression (as in
Henderson et al. 2012):
ln(zct) =  ln(yct) + c + t + wct+ ct (15)
where zct is the real GDP of country c in year t (from the World Bank
World Development Indicators), yct is the light reading of country c in year
t, c and t are country and year xed e¤ects respectively, wct is a lin-
ear country time-trend, and ct is an error term. The regression is run
26Output in Rwanda declined by around 50% as a result of the genocide in 1994, and
this is also visible in the lights output (see Henderson et al 2012).
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at country-level due to the paucity of African GDP estimates at the sub-
national level (which is the primary motivation for using lights). However,
Statistics South Africa have been producing annual GDP estimates for Ad-
min 1 regions since 1995, and so I am able to run the regression at the
regional level on this small sub-sample.
Results are provided in Table 1.1. Columns (1) and (2) are run at
the country-level over 1992-2012, and columns (3) and (4) are run for the
South African regions over 1995-2012. Columns (2) and (4) include the
linear time trend wct, and thus measure correlations in terms of deviations
from trend. All columns indicate a signicant correlation between o¢ cial
GDP and lights, with an elasticity of around 0.5 when the time trend is
excluded. The level of signicance is somewhat weaker when using the
South African regional data, although with such a limited sample the results
are encouraging.
Table 1.1: The elasticity of GDP w.r.t. lights
SAF (regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(yct) 0.506*** 0.329*** 0.468* 0.145*
(0.059) (0.070) (0.229) (0.073)
Time trend No Yes No Yes
Obs. 819 819 162 162
Countries/Regions 39 39 9 9
R-Squared 0.83 0.94 0.58 0.76
Robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
The results in Table 1.1 support those presented in Storeygard (2014),
and suggest that luminosity data can be used as a proxy for economic output
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at the local level in Africa. This justies the use of lights as a proxy for
regional output in the estimation of equation (14). Ultimately however,
I would like to use the results of (14) to make inferences regarding the
response of domestic output to changes in foreign output. That is, I am
ultimately interested in the response of GDP in region i (denoted zi) to
changes in GDP in region j (denoted zj), rather than the response of lights
in i (denoted yi) to lights in j (denoted yj).
It can be shown that the two elasticities are the same. Denote the
"GDP elasticity" by "1  dzidzj
zj
zi
and the "lights elasticity" by "2  dyidyj
yj
yi
.
We have also estimated the elasticity of GDP to lights in Table 1.1, denoted
by "3  dzidyi
yi
zi
. From the chain rule, dzi
dzj
= dzi
dyi
dyi
dyj
dyj
dzj
and so, multiplying by
zj
zi
,
"1 =
dzi
dzj
zj
zi
=

dzi
dyi
yi
zi

| {z }
"3

dyi
dyj
yj
yi

| {z }
"2

dyj
dzj
zj
yj

| {z }
" 13
= "2:
I use this result in section 1.6 to analyse the implications of changes in
IMA for changes in domestic output.
Issues and limitations
As discussed in Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), luminosity data
su¤ers from saturation and "blooming". Saturation occurs due to the sen-
sor technology, which only registers light output up to a certain level. This
results in top-coding, such that all lights bright enough to reach the upper
bound are coded with a value of 63. In reality however, such a level of
luminosity generally occurs within wealthy urban centres. (As discussed
above, there is also an issue of bottom-coding.) In Africa, top-coding is
extremely rare; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) note that in their
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African sample less than 0.0001 percent of pixels are top-coded.
A more pertinent issue with the lights data is "blooming" or "overglow".
Blooming occurs when a source of light is bright enough that some of its
glare is captured in the readings of neighbouring pixels. This is a geocoding
error, that could generate a manual correlation between lights growth in
neighbouring areas. Reassuringly however, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2013) nd that because luminosity is generally low in Africa, blooming is
not a major concern in this sample. More concretely, Pinkovsky (2013)
nds that the e¤ect of blooming on measured light output is insignicant
beyond a 10 km bu¤er. For my baseline results, I therefore bu¤er all country
borders by 10 km to account for blooming.27
1.4.3 Market access
To construct the [IMAit term, I calculate the distance from each region i
to each foreign region j. Distances are calculated using the great circle dis-
tance from the largest city in each region, based on lights output in 2000.28
In calculating [IMAit, I restrict the set of foreign regions j to lie within
the same UNECA "sub-region" as i - these consist of West Africa, Cen-
tral Africa, Eastern Africa and Southern Africa.29 The motivation for this
is that (i) the vast majority of international trade takes place within the
same sub-region, and (ii) when considering trade ows across sub-regions,
27Because borders are bu¤ered by 10 km on each side, there is a minimum of 20 km
between light readings either side of country borders. In practice, bu¤ering country
borders makes very little di¤erence to the results. In the Appendix I show that my
results are almost identical if no bu¤er is used, and I have also experimented with other
bu¤er distances, again with very little e¤ect.
28I take the centroid of the largest city (contiguous block of urban cells) based on
light output in 2000. To accurately calculate distance, I then project these points to
the African Sinusoidal (projected) coordinate system. Geodesic distances, that take into
account the curvature of the globe, are then calculated using the Generate Near Table
tool. All steps are done in ArcMap 10.2.1.
29See http://www.uneca.org/pages/subregional-o¢ ces. The Admin 1 regions of any
immediate neighbour that is not in the same UNECA "sub-region" are also included in
the calculation of\IMAit.
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the relative locations of regions within the same country becomes trivial
relative to the overall distance between domestic and foreign regions. Run-
ning equation (14) including two [IMAit terms, one calculated from foreign
regions within the same UNECA sub-region as i, and one calculated from
foreign regions outside the UNECA sub-region, shows that only the rst is
signicant. In addition, the main results of interest (presented in Table 1.4)
remain strongly signicant if [IMAit is calculated using all foreign regions.
For the baseline results in Table 1.4, I exclude all observations from
countries that are in conict according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict
Database.30 Conicts tend to be concentrated in particular regions within a
country, and so some regions su¤er large falls in output regardless of changes
in their market access. It therefore seems sensible to exclude all regions of
a country for years in which the country is in conict. In Appendix A.2
I show that the results are robust to including all observations, including
conict years.
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1.2. As the lights data are avail-
able over 1992-2012, the summary statistics and all subsequent analysis
covers this period. All mainland Sub-Saharan African countries are in-
cluded except for Equatorial Guinea, which is dropped (as in Henderson et
al. 2012) because almost all of the light output is from gas ares. As a tiny
country, it also has only one mainland region.
30Only "intense" conict years are excluded, which are those that result in a minimum
of 1,000 battle-related deaths.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Mean Median s.d. Min Max
Countries 40
Regions 530
Observations 11,130
Regions per country 13.25 10.50 10.66 3 40
Region growth (lights) 0.05 0.04 0.07 -1.00 0.24
Country growth (lights) 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.10
Country growth (GDP) 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.09
Partner regions 140.17 129 55.72 46 218
Distance (km) 1,248.64 1,164.91 659.00 68.10 2,927.13
Growth rates are compound annual averages, and must be multiplied by 100 for a percentage gure.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Gravity model
Table 1.3 presents the results of running equation (12), a structural grav-
ity model, for the Sub-Saharan African sample over 1992-2012. The set
of control variables follows Mayer (2009), and consists of distance (km),
contiguity (denoted border), common language, RTA membership and CU
membership. This is a standard set of controls in the gravity literature (see
e.g. Head and Mayer 2015), although in alternate columns I exclude the po-
tentially endogenous RTA and CU variables. Columns (1) and (2) include
importer and exporter xed e¤ects and columns (3) to (6) include a full-set
of importer-year and exporter-year xed e¤ects. This is now best practice in
the literature (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004), as it most closely follows
the theoretical gravity model (equation (4)). Finally, columns (5) to (6) are
estimated using a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator
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(Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006) instead of ordinary least squares (OLS).
The variables enter signicantly throughout, with each taking the ex-
pected sign. Perhaps the most striking results are the magnitudes of the
distance and RTA variables. Although estimates of RTA e¤ects vary widely,
Head and Mayers (2015) meta-analysis nds a median estimate of just 0.28.
The large coe¢ cients in Table 1.3 are particularly surprising given the com-
mon view that African RTAs are less e¤ective than average (see e.g. Roberts
and Deichmann 2011). A satisfactory explanation for this nding would re-
quire further research, although I note here that the main results of interest
for this paper - the impact of market access on output - are not sensitive
to the particular coe¢ cients in Table 1.3.31
As with the RTA dummy, the coe¢ cient on distance in the OLS regres-
sions is slightly larger than typical estimates.32 This is less surprising than
the RTA e¤ect however, as the poor state of African infrastructure (Limao
and Venables 2001) and logistics services (Arvis et al. 2012) both sug-
gest that transport costs rise rapidly with distance. In practice, it is likely
that African trade is even more geographically concentrated than the esti-
mates here suggest. Survey evidence shows that informal cross-border trade
occurs on a substantial scale across the continent, with volumes in some ar-
eas comparable to o¢ cial trade (Lesser & Moisé-Leeman 2009, Afrika and
Ajumbo 2012). Much of this trade is in food, agriculture and low quality
manufactures, meaning that much of it is concentrated around border re-
gions (Lesser and Moisé-Leeman 2009, Golub (forthcoming)). Hence overall
trade likely declines more rapidly in distance than o¢ cial trade: the esti-
mates here may in fact underestimate the true e¤ect of distance on trade
in Africa.
31In Table 1.4 I show that the e¤ect of market access on output is robust to the
di¤erent gravity specications in Table 1.3, and in robustness checks I show that this
further extends to using the median gravity estimates from Head and Mayer (2015).
32Head and Mayer (2015) nd a median coe¢ cient on distance of -1.1 from structural
gravity regressions with a standard deviation of 0.4.
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Table 1.3: Gravity results (1992-2012)
OLS (CFE) OLS (CYFE) PPML (CYFE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln (dist) -1.992*** -1.489*** -2.001*** -1.438*** -1.683*** -1.191***
(0.103) (0.126) (0.108) (0.138) (0.180) (0.192)
border 0.908*** 0.958*** 0.909*** 0.968*** 0.287 0.477**
(0.201) (0.193) (0.209) (0.200) (0.234) (0.228)
lang: 0.854*** 0.566*** 0.864*** 0.580*** 0.680*** 0.509*
(0.118) (0.141) (0.123) (0.146) (0.207) (0.289)
RTA 0.993*** 1.132*** 0.816***
(0.160) (0.190) (0.236)
CU 0.845*** 0.827** 0.666*
(0.318) (0.331) (0.404)
Obs. 13,710 13,710 13,710 13,710 13,711 13,711
R-squared 0.56 0.57 0.60 0.61 0.91 0.92
Robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.5.2 Regional output and market access
Having generated estimates for the trade cost parameters, I can now con-
sider the e¤ect of IMA on regional output. To do so I substitute the coef-
cients from Table 1.3 into my expression for market access, [IMAit from
equation (13), and regress regional output on this estimated market access
term - equation (14).
The results from equation (14) are presented in Table 1.4. I consider
three alternative estimates of market access: [IMA1 is calculated using col-
umn (2) from Table 1.3, [IMA2 uses column (4) from Table 1.3 and [IMA3
uses column (6) from Table 1.3. That is, the di¤erent market access terms
are calculated from (13) using estimates from the three di¤erent specica-
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tions in Table 1.3: OLS (CFE), OLS (CYFE) and Poisson (CYFE).
In all columns of Table 1.4, IMA has a positive and highly signicant
e¤ect on regional output. I consider the results in columns (4) and (6) to
be the best estimates, and will work with these estimates in the calibration
below. In both cases the parameters of the [IMA term are estimated using a
full set of CYFE, and any long-term regional growth paths are controlled for
with the time trend. These estimates put the elasticity of regional output
w.r.t. IMA in the range 0.7 to 0.9.
These estimates suggest that regional output responds strongly to changes
in IMA. Previous work, estimated at country-level, has produced compa-
rable albeit slightly smaller estimates. Mayer (2009) regresses income per
capita on a measure of "foreign market potential" over 1960-2003, nding
an elasticity of 0.88 from a random e¤ects model and 0.57 when including
country xed e¤ects.33 In earlier work, Redding and Venables (2004) apply
the same approach as Mayer on a single cross-section of countries in 1996,
and nd an elasticity of 0.48 on "foreign market access".
33Mayers (2009) "foreign market potential" term is, from his model, very similar to
that used here. His empirical approach is quite di¤erent however. Rather than including
a measure of market potential directly, he demonstrates that it can be captured by the
country xed e¤ect coe¢ cients from an initial gravity regression. That approach is not
applicable here because I am calculating market access for sub-national units.
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Table 1.4: Regional output and market access (1992-2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln([IMA1) 0.940*** 0.639**
(0.341) (0.258)
ln([IMA2) 0.980*** 0.665**
(0.364) (0.273)
ln([IMA3) 1.355** 0.892**
(0.527) (0.391)
Time trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 8,956 8,956 8,956 8,956 8,956 8,956
Regions 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-Squared 0.58 0.75 0.58 0.75 0.58 0.75
Robust standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.5.3 Identication and robustness
The results presented in Table 1.4 show that there is a robust correlation
between changes in a regions IMA and changes in its own output. Based
on the model presented in Section 1.2, I argue that this is driven by trade:
as IMA increases, demand for local goods increases which drives increases
in local production. In this sub-section I aim to establish both that trade is
indeed the driving mechanism, and that this is a causal relationship. To do
so, I present a number of falsication and robustness checks in Table 1.5.34
Firstly, if the e¤ect of IMA is working through trade, we would ex-
pect to nd a smaller e¤ect between countries that do not have trading
relationships with each other.35 To test this, I gather data on diplomatic
34Each column in Table 1.5 includes the region-specic linear time trend.
35The e¤ect would not necessarily be zero, as informal cross-border trade takes place
on a substantial scale across the continent (Lesser and Moisé-Leeman 2009). This is
likely the case even amongst countries with poor o¢ cial relations.
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relations from the Correlates of Wars Diplomatic Exchange Database, and
classify countries based on whether they had diplomatic relations with each
other over the period (1992-2012). For each region, I then calculate two
[IMA terms: one across countries with which it had diplomatic relations
([IMA_D), and another across regions in countries with which it did not
([IMA_ND). Reassuringly, in column (1) we see that the [IMA term is
signicant only amongst countries with diplomatic relations.
Secondly, there may be localised shocks, such as higher commodity prices
or cross-border investment projects, that simultaneously benet neighbour-
ing regions. This would generate a positive correlation between output and
market access, but not due to the trade channel posited here. To reduce
such concerns, column (2) excludes all regions within 100 km of the domes-
tic region when calculating [IMA.36 Column (3) drops the closest foreign
region, so that any localised shock would have to cover a number of regions
to drive the correlation between IMA and domestic output. In both cases,
the [IMA term remains highly signicant.
Column (4) controls for neighbouring conicts, which can spill across
national borders through refugee ows, direct violence or destruction of
infrastructure. This acts like a specic localised shock, generating a simul-
taneous (negative) shock to both IMA and domestic output. To control
for this, I create a dummy variable (denoted conflict_neigh) that equals
1 if a regions nearest neighbour is in conict in year t.37 In column (4)
this variable enters negatively but insignicantly, whereas the coe¢ cient on
[IMA remains largely unchanged and highly signicant.
Finally, columns (5) and (6) address potential reverse causality from do-
mestic output to IMA. This occurs because an increase in domestic output
increases every foreign regions IMA, increasing their output, which in turn
increases the domestic regions IMA. In practice this concern is reduced
36That is 100 km between the "capital" of each region.
37Neighbouring conicts are dened in the same way as domestic conicts (Section
1.4), as a year in which there are 1,000 or more battle-related deaths according to the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conicts Database.
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because every regions IMA is calculated based on the output of a large
number of regions (140 on average, see Table 1.2). Still, it may be the
case that some regions are large enough to individually a¤ect output in the
wider area in a meaningful way. To account for this possibility, column (5)
drops all observations from the economically largest region of each country.
Column (6) drops all observations from the largest country in each UNECA
sub-region. Hence even when equation (14) is run only with economically
small regions, the [IMA term remains positive and signicant.38
38The exception is the ln(\IMA3) term in column (5) which becomes insignicant. The
coe¢ cient remains economically substantial however, and is signicant if the regional
time-trend is not included.
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Table 1.5: Identication and robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS ([IMA2)
ln ([IMA2) 0.661* 0.856** 0.640** 0.459* 0.607**
(0.388) (0.411) (0.268) (0.276) (0.277)
ln ([IMA_D) 0.574**
(0.271)
ln ([IMA_ND) 0.515
(0.405)
Conict_neigh -0.058
(0.036)
Obs. 8,164 8,956 8,956 8,956 8,172 7,633
Regions 470 508 508 508 468 445
R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Panel B: PPML ([IMA3)
ln ([IMA3) 1.021** 1.285** 0.870** 0.599 0.827**
(0.517) (0.556) (0.385) (0.408) (0.397)
ln ([IMA_D) 0.809**
(0.390)
ln ([IMA_ND) 0.542
(0.500)
Conict_neigh -0.056
(0.036)
Obs. 8,164 8,956 8,956 8,956 8,172 7,633
Regions 470 508 508 508 468 445
R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
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The results in Table 1.5 support the claim that there is a causal link
between [IMA and domestic output, and that this relationship is driven
by trade. In Appendix A.2 I provide a number of more general robustness
checks. I remove the 10 km bu¤ers around country borders; include do-
mestic conict years; include domestic regions in the calculation of [IMA;
include North African regions in the calculation of [IMA; recalculate [IMA
using the gravity estimates of Head and Mayer (2015); restrict the sample
to regions that have a positive light reading in every year; drop all obser-
vations from 1992; and drop countries with a population below 5 million in
2000. In all cases the [IMA term remains positive and signicant.
1.6 Growth and Policy Implications
1.6.1 Implied growth due to IMA
Reecting a general improvement in Africas macroeconomic performance,
the average regions IMA grew by almost 4 percent a year during 1992-
2012. As the results in Table 1.4 show that output increases log-linearly
with IMA, we can calculate the implied increase in regional output resulting
from this increase in IMA. To do so, note that the log-linear relationship
implies that  ln(Yit) = b ln([IMAit), which in turn implies that
Yit   Yit 1
Yit 1
=
 
[IMAit
[IMAit 1
!b
  1 (16)
where Yit Yit 1
Yit 1
is the growth of Yi between t   1 and t. Based on my
preferred estimates of b from Table 1.4, from columns (4) and (6), I can
calculate the implied change in regional output over 1992-2012 as a direct
result of changes to [IMAit using equation (16).
A similar exercise to this is undertaken by Donaldson and Hornbeck
(2013), who use their reduced form market access results to calculate the
implied e¤ect of US railways on historical land values. To justify the ap-
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proach, the authors rst demonstrate that the relationship between land
values (in my case output) and market access is indeed log-linear. I follow
this approach here. First, in Figure 1.2, I plot the tted values of ln(Yit)
and ln([IMAit), having rst regressed both variables on the set of region
and country-year xed e¤ects. Although there is still a reasonable amount
of variation, the conditional relationship between the two variables does
appear to be log-linear.
Figure 1.2: Output and market access
In Figure 1.3, I provide evidence that the relationship between changes in
output and market access is log-linear. Following Donaldson and Hornbeck
(2013), I plot a kernel-weighted local polynomial of changes in ln(Yit) and
ln([IMAit), again using the tted values after regressing both variables on
region and country-year xed e¤ects. The rst chart presents results for
the full sample, and the second excludes outliers by restricting changes in
market access to within 2 standard deviations of the mean. There appears
to be an approximately linear relationship between changes in log output
and log market access, particularly in the lower chart that excludes outliers.
As noted in Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013), the log-linear relationship is
also a prediction of the model, which strengthens the case for using this
functional form for the calculations that follow.
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Figure 1.3: Changes in output and market access
As equation (16) is based on reduced form regressions of output on mar-
ket access, an additional concern is whether the market access term is truly
exogenous. Section 1.5.3 undertakes some robustness tests for this, but it
is noted again here that two potential sources of endogeneity are localised
shocks and reverse causality. In general we would expect both sources of
endogeneity to result in an upward bias, meaning that the calculations here
might overstate the true impact of IMA on growth over the period. I there-
fore present the growth implications using both the baseline estimates of b
and the lowest estimate from the robustness tests in Table 1.5 - estimated
using economically small regions only, to account for reverse causality.
The results of equation (16) are summarised in Table 1.6, which provides
simple means and standard deviations across regions (using weighted means
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produces very similar results). Using the baseline results, from Table 1.4,
changes in [IMA alone imply growth in regional output of around 62 to
87 percent over the period 1992-2012. This equates to an average annual
growth rate in the range 2.3 to 3.0 percent. The lower robustness result,
in the nal column, implies average annual growth of 1.6 percent. These
estimates are substantial, and challenge the view that spillover e¤ects are
small in Africa (World Bank 2009). In fact, based on the evidence here,
developments in neighbouring countries have sizeable e¤ects on the domestic
economy.
Table 1.6: Implied regional growth due to [IMA
(1) (2) (3)
OLS PPML Robust.b = 0:665 b = 0:892 b = 0:459
Total growth, 1992-2012 (%) 61.85 86.60 39.20
(19.66) (26.36) (11.73)
Annual average growth (%) 2.30 2.99 1.58
(0.69) (0.84) (0.47)
Entries are simple means across regions, standard deviation in parentheses.
The geographic variation in growth due to [IMA is shown in Figure
1.4 (using the estimates from column 1 of Table 1.6). The largest gains
are in West Africa, where in a number of regions growth in [IMA alone
implies a doubling of domestic output over the period. In the south, the
regions bordering South Africa enjoy the highest levels of IMA, but have
been adversely a¤ected by comparatively weak South African growth. This
is particularly true for Botswana, southern Namibia and southern Mozam-
bique, highlighting the importance of South Africa for the wider regions
prosperity (Arora and Vamvakidis 2005).
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Figure 1.4: Implied regional growth (%)
1.6.2 Case studies: South Africa and Nigeria
In this sub-section I quantify the importance of South Africa to the wider
Southern region, as well as Nigerias importance to West Africa. The two
countries dominate the Sub-Saharan economy, together accounting for over
half of total output and almost a quarter of intra-African imports in 2012.39
Here I demonstrate how their fortunes a¤ect their immediate neighbours,
by calculating the change in each of their neighboursgrowth rates resulting
from a 1 percentage point annual increase in South African and Nigerian
growth.40
The results are presented in Table 1.7. The "previous" column shows
the annual average growth rate in each country based on equation (16), as in
Table 1.6 (using column (1), b = 0:665), and the "new" column repeats the
calculation but with higher Yjt gures for the South African and Nigerian
39Using GDP gures from the World Bank and import gures from Comtrade.
40I increase the annual growth of each South African and Nigerian region by 1% point.
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regions in [IMAit. For South Africa the largest gains accrue, as expected,
to Lesotho and Swaziland, where growth in each country expands by more
than 0.6 percentage points per year. Mozambique gains the least of all the
neighbours, as South Africa is less important to the market access of its
northern regions. Even here though, each addtional percentage point of
growth in South Africas regions contributes an additional 0.5 percentage
points of growth in Mozambique.
The impact of Nigerian growth is lower than that of South Africa owing
both to its smaller economy and its higher trade costs with its neighbours.41
Its economic impact is still considerable however, with a 1 percentage point
increase in growth reected in at least a quarter of a percentage point of
growth amongst each of its immediate neighbours.
41South Africa is a member of an RTA with all of its neighbours, and shares a currency
with Lesotho, Namibia Swaziland; Nigeria shares a currency with none of its neighbours
and is in an RTA with only Benin and Niger. In addition, South Africa shares a common
language with all of its neighbours except Mozambique, whereas Nigeria shares a common
language only with Cameroon.
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Table 1.7: E¤ect of higher South African & Nigerian growth
Previous New Di¤erence
Annual average growth rates (%) (%)
South African e¤ect
Botswana 1.11 1.71 0.60
Lesotho 1.07 1.73 0.65
Mozambique 1.23 1.73 0.50
Namibia 1.20 1.81 0.61
Swaziland 1.14 1.78 0.64
Zimbabwe 1.46 1.97 0.51
Nigerian e¤ect
Benin 1.78 2.17 0.40
Cameroon 1.64 1.98 0.34
Chad 1.89 2.13 0.25
Niger 2.52 2.81 0.29
Based on a 1% point annual increase in growth in each South African and Nigerian region.
1.6.3 Policy evaluation: West African currency union
It is argued above that Nigerias high trade costs reduce the extent to which
its growth benets its neighbours. More generally, any policy that lowers
trade costs increases IMA and thus increases both growth spillovers and
domestic output. Based on the gravity results, we can quantify the extent
to which specic policies will increase IMA, and then based on the results
in Table 1.4, we can estimate the impact of this policy on output.
In this sub-section I calibrate the impact of a specic policy with impli-
cations for both Nigeria and the surrounding neighbourhood. Specically,
six West African countries - Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and
Sierra Leone - are proposing to enter into a CU, sharing a new currency
called the eco.42 Ultimately, this CU will expand to incorporate the existing
42See http://www.economist.com/news/nance-and-economics/21591246-continent-
47
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). As the primary
motivation for a CU is to boost trade, in this section I calibrate the extent to
which this proposed CU would increase market access, and in turn increase
output. I ask the following: how much higher would predicted output be
in 2012 if the CU was in place?
The implied output change for each country is provided in Table 1.8.
As the output change is very sensitive to how much a CU boosts trade, I
consider a range of estimates from the literature. That is, in each column I
re-estimate [IMA (in both the actual and counterfactual worlds), replacing
the CU coe¢ cient from Table 1.3 with previous estimates from the liter-
ature. Column (1) uses my estimate from Table 1.3 (column 4), column
(2) uses the estimate of Tsangarides et al. (2008) as this is also based on
African trade ows, and column (3) uses the median estimate from Head
and Mayers (2015) gravity meta-analysis. Columns (4) to (6) are based
on papers that have explicitly addressed the potential endogeneity of CUs:
Barro and Tenreyro (2007), estimated using instrumental variables; Rose
(2001), estimated with pair xed e¤ects; and Rose (2001) estimated using
a matching technique.
My baseline estimate in column (1) is that the proposed CU would
boost aggregate West African output by almost 40 percent, based on the
predicted increase in trade. The biggest winners are the countries that are
not members of the current CU, the WAEMU, as their trade costs with the
entire WAEMU block are lowered. Based on the CU e¤ect estimated by
Barro and Tenreyro (2007), the output of such countries would more than
double. Such dramatic output gains are driven by their estimate that a CU
increases trade by over 500 percent. At the other extreme, the estimates in
column (6), based on Roses matching technique, imply that such countries
would gain an output boost of only around 15 percent. As the precise
impact of a CU on trade is still debated, quantifying the output gains from
mulls-merging-currencies-ever-closer
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such policies remains possible only within wide bounds.
Table 1.8: Output change from CU expansion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Tsangarides H & M B & T Rose Rose
All 38.4 19.7 45.6 85.2 34.3 8.5
Benin 41.7 21.4 49.4 89.8 37.3 9.3
Burkina Faso 16.7 9.6 19.0 28.4 15.3 4.5
Cote dIvoire 34.0 18.0 39.8 67.6 30.6 8.0
Gambia, The 72.8 32.9 91.3 252.1 63.2 13.4
Ghana 73.3 33.1 91.8 253.4 63.5 13.5
Guinea-Bissau 13.3 7.8 15.1 22.2 12.3 3.7
Guinea 73.1 33.0 91.7 253.0 63.4 13.4
Liberia 73.2 33.0 91.7 253.2 63.5 13.4
Mali 9.2 5.4 10.4 14.9 8.5 2.6
Niger 39.9 20.6 47.1 84.1 35.7 9.0
Nigeria 59.6 26.6 74.9 210.5 51.6 10.8
Senegal 23.1 12.4 26.9 44.6 20.9 5.5
Sierra Leone 73.0 33.0 91.5 252.6 63.3 13.4
Togo 29.7 16.1 34.5 56.4 26.9 7.2
CU coe¢ cient 0.85 0.43 0.98 1.90 0.74 0.19
Sample Africa Africa Global Global Global Global
1.7 Conclusion
This paper considers how African countries are a¤ected by the growth of
their neighbours, and how they can increase the spillover of neighbouring
growth into domestic growth. I present a trade model that derives domestic
output as a function of the output in all other regions, with each region
weighted by the cost of trade. That is, a regions output is a function
of its "market access". Higher growth elsewhere increases market access,
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increasing the demand for local goods. Lower trade costs work in the same
direction. Thus, lowering trade costs further increases the gains that an
area receives from higher growth amongst its neighbours.
To concentrate on international spillovers, I include only foreign regions
in the calculation of market access for the empirical work. I am able to
conduct the empirical work at the sub-national level by exploiting lumi-
nosity data to generate a panel of regional output over 1992-2012. This
advances both previous work on spillovers in Africa (Collier and OConnell
2007, Roberts and Deichmann 2011) and the related market access litera-
ture (Redding and Venables 2004, Mayer 2009), which work with country-
level data. My empirical work shows that international market access is
an important determinant of the growth of domestic regions: increases in
international market access are reected in signicant regional growth, with
an elasticity between 0.7 and 0.9.
I noted in the introduction that African economic integration is now a
top priority of policy makers. In large part, this stems from the di¢ culty
that most countries face in penetrating global markets. Agglomeration
forces have clustered manufacturing activity in East Asia, generating con-
cerns that many African countries have "missed the boat" of globalisation
(see World Bank 2002, Collier 2008). For the landlocked countries, higher
freight and insurance costs multiply this challenge (Limao and Venables
2001, Faye et al. 2004). The World Bank (2009) argues that "for small
countries far from world markets but close to a large developing country
[such as South Africa or Nigeria], their best prospects often lie in growth
in the dominant economy" (p.272). In this paper, I show that by reduc-
ing trade costs and increasing integration, such prospects are substantially
improved.
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2 Bad neighbours as obstacles to trade: Ev-
idence from African civil wars
Abstract
I analyse a cost unique to landlocked countries: access to the sea re-
quires passage through neighbouring countries. What happens to transport
costs and trade when these neighbours are in conict? Based on data for
landlocked African countries over 1975-2005, I show a sizeable e¤ect on
both transport costs and international trade ows. My results imply an
elasticity of trade with respect to transport costs in the range -3 to -6. For
the group of landlocked countries, I nd that trade could have been around
12 percent higher in the absence of such shocks. Even then however, per
capita trade would still have been half that of the coastal countries.43
43I am grateful to my supervisor Tim Besley for continued advice and support. I
also thank Jane Ansell, Jean-Francois Arvis, Uwe Deichmann, Olivier Hartmann, Guy
Michaels, Gael Raballand, Marcia Schafgans, Silvana Tenreyro and Benedict Wall for
their time and input. Finally I thank seminar participants at LSE, Oxford, the Annual
FIW International Economics Conference and the Annual CSAE Conference for many
useful suggestions.
51
2.1 Introduction
The plight of landlocked countries is one of the most striking and enduring
 features of the developing world. As demonstrated in Table 2.1, per
capita income and trade gures are just half that of coastal countries. In
Africa, where the majority of the worlds landlocked population lives, these
gures drop to just a third. The success of landlocked countries in the
developed world is equally notable however. Particularly in western Europe,
landlocked countries have prospered. Seemingly there is a substantial cost
to being landlocked in some regions, but not in others.
Landlocked countries face a unique development obstacle: they must
transit neighbouring countries to access seaborne trade. In Africa, such
transit is characterised by limited infrastructure (Limao and Venables 2001),
ine¢ cient services (Arvis et al. 2010), frequent road blocks (USAID 2010)
and security concerns (Faye et al. 2004). The gulf between landlocked
and coastal trade volumes remains vast, and overseas exports are over-
whelmingly concentrated in primary commodities. Collier (2008) argues
that being landlocked with bad neighbours is a development trap.
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Table 2.1: Landlocked GDP and trade in 2012 (relative to
coastal)
Developing High-income Global
All Africa All W. Europe
GDP per capita 0.47 0.34 1.00 1.31 0.39
Trade per capita 0.48 0.30 1.99 1.60 0.65
LL population (mil.) 471 275 33 17 504
LL population
(fraction of total) 0.08 0.30 0.03 0.09 0.07
Based on data from the World Bank World Development Indicators. Trade is the mean of exports and imports. High-
income countries are those as defined in the World Bank country classification 2013: those with a (2012) GNI per
capita of $12,616 or more. Developing countries are defined here as all non-high income countries. Africa refers to
sub-Saharan Africa only, again as defined in the World Bank country classifications 2013. Western Europe is as
defined in the United Nations geoscheme, which includes continental Europe only.
Just how important are neighbours to the success of landlocked coun-
tries? Despite suggestive evidence, we know little regarding magnitudes or
the precise channels through which neighbours are important. The gures
in Table 2.1 for example might be largely explained by distance; landlocked
countries are more disadvantaged relative to coastal countries in Africa than
they are in Europe, because the relative distances to major markets are
so much greater. Alternatively, any apparent "landlocked e¤ect" may be
largely spurious. Borchert et al. (2012) for example question the view that
landlocked countries are "victims of geography", nding that they often
have more restrictive trade policies than coastal countries. They nd that
this is particularly true in Africa, and that this can be partially explained
by weak institutions.
The aim of this paper is therefore to provide causal, quantitative, evi-
dence that neighbours are important to the prosperity of landlocked coun-
tries. I focus on the channel that is unique to landlocked countries: neigh-
bours are obstacles to seaborne trade. I use civil wars in neighbouring
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countries as natural experiments, increasing the size of these obstacles.44
Applying this strategy to Africa over 1975-2005, I show that by obstructing
the shortest route to the coast, neighbouring civil wars (i) increase transport
costs and (ii) reduce the overseas trade of landlocked countries.
There are two principal contributions of the paper. The rst is to provide
causal, quantitative, evidence that "neighbours matter". Bad neighbours
impose a cost on landlocked countries because they obstruct their access to
the coast; this cost is unique to landlocked countries and helps to explain the
"landlocked penalty" shown in Table 2.1. Calibrating the regression results
shows that the international trade of landlocked countries could have been
12 percent higher during the period in the absence of neighbouring civil
wars. The results further suggest that neighbouring civil wars account
for around 10 percent of the di¤erence between (per capita) landlocked
and coastal trade volumes over the period. Landlocked African countries
therefore face additional barriers to development, being dependent on others
for access to the coast.45
The second contribution of the paper is to provide rare evidence on
the importance of transport costs to international trade. Despite the ob-
vious policy implications, such evidence is sparse because transport costs
are typically endogenous. For landlocked countries however, neighbouring
civil wars act as natural experiments increasing the distance to the coast
44The most closely related work is that of Qureshi (2013), which provides strong evi-
dence that neighbouring conicts reduce international trade. The advance in this paper
is to concentrate on a particular mechanism: transport costs. Doing so enables me to
calibrate the importance of transport costs to trade, an issue of particular importance to
international trade models. I also focus specically on developing landlocked countries,
i.e. those that are most likely to be vulnerable to regional instability and those with the
lowest levels of international trade.
45The landlocked penaltyin Table 1 can partly be explained by distance; landlocked
countries are further from overseas trading partners and therefore are expected to trade
less. This paper shows however that there are costs associated with being landlocked
itself; for a given distance, landlocked countries are disadvantaged because they are
reliant on passage through other countries. In related, earlier work, Limao & Venables
(2001) show that landlocked countries have higher transport costs even conditioning on
distance.
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and thus creating an exogenous shock to transport costs. The identica-
tion strategy of the paper is therefore to treat neighbouring civil wars as
exogenous shocks to transport costs, and estimate the response of trade to
these shocks. (I rst demonstrate in section 2.4 that neighbouring civil wars
do indeed increase transport costs.) I estimate an elasticity of trade w.r.t.
transport costs in the range -3 to -6, which is slightly larger than previous
available estimates (see Table 2.6).
I argue that this large trade response is due to the export proles of land-
locked African countries, being primarily concentrated in primary commodi-
ties. It is possible however that there are other conict-related spillovers,
besides higher transport costs, that also disrupt trade. This might produce
an over-estimate of the importance of transport costs, as these other factors
(such as an increase in domestic unrest and military spending) could also
explain the link between neighbouring conicts and reduced trade.46 To
try and isolate the e¤ects of transport disruptions alone, I explicitly map
the transit routes of the landlocked countries and exploit GPS data on the
location of neighbouring civil wars. Further, I rule out a number of other
spillover e¤ects from conicts that could plausibly drive the results. Finally,
I nd no evidence that conicts in "non-transit" neighbours reduce trade,
or that the trade of coastal countries is a¤ected by neighbouring conicts.
Both results support the view that the underlying mechanism is indeed a
transport cost shock.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related lit-
erature, section 2.3 discusses the sample and the creation of the dataset,
section 2.4 estimates the response of transport costs to neighbouring con-
icts, section 2.5 estimates the response of international trade, and section
2.6 calibrates the results. Section 2.7 concludes.
46When analysing trade ows, I consider overseas trade only as it is only these partners
with whom distance has increased. Therefore any mechanical reduction in aggregate
trade, due to lower trade with the neighbour itself, would not a¤ect the results.
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2.2 Related Literature
2.2.1 The costs of being landlocked
As highlighted in the introduction, there is a substantial penalty to being
landlocked in Africa and in the developing world more widely. Access to
markets is the most plausible explanation for this nding. Collier (2006)
for example disaggregates landlocked and coastal countries according to
whether they are resource-rich or resource-scarce. He notes that amongst
resource-rich countries, there is no signicant penalty to being landlocked.
If resources are su¢ ciently valuable as in the case of Botswana any ad-
ditional costs of being landlocked are surmountable. Botswanas diamond
exports for example  which constitute the vast majority of its exports
(Deaton 1999) are valuable enough to be transported by air (Faye et al.
2004). Amongst the resource-scarce countries however, there is a dramatic
divergence between coastal and landlocked groups: the worlds most suc-
cessful countries tend to belong to the former group, and the least successful
to the latter. Switzerland and Austria are exceptions because being land-
locked has not constrained their access to markets; indeed their geographical
position places them at the centre of a successful regional economy.
In the African case, being landlocked has constrained access to mar-
kets because the main trading partners are predominantly overseas: intra-
African trade is comparatively small. As argued by Collier and Gunning
(1999), Africas landlocked economies trade with Europe, so that neigh-
bouring countries are an obstacle rather than a market(p.15). A sense of
this obstacle is provided by Limao and Venables (2001), who consider the
determinants of international transport costs using data on the cost of ship-
ping a 40-foot container from Baltimore, Maryland, to various cities around
the world. Not only do they nd that land distance is substantially more
costly than sea distance an extra 1,000 km by land adding $1,380 to the
shipping cost compared to just $190 by sea but shipping to landlocked
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countries is signicantly more costly even controlling for land distance.47
The authors postulate several reasons for this excess landlocked cost 
border delays, coordination problems, higher insurance costs, and direct
charges made by the transit country. As the cost of sea distance has been
declining over time, it is possible that the landlocked penalty will become
even more signicant in the future (Arvis et al. 2010).
2.2.2 Transport costs and trade
How do these additional transport costs impact on international trade?
Although the gravity model has established a robust correlation between
distance and trade ows, the relationship between distance and transport
costs is far less clear. Consequently, so is the relationship between transport
costs and trade.
Head and Mayer (2015) undertake a meta-analysis of gravity estimates
and nd a mean elasticity of trade w.r.t. distance of -1.1. That is, a
10 percent increase in distance between countries leads to an 11 percent
reduction in bilateral trade. As argued by Feyrer (2009) however, distance
captures not only transport costs but also a range of unobservables such as
tastes and cultural di¤erences. A good example of this is provided by Blum
and Goldfarb (2006), who nd large distance e¤ects for goods consumed
over the internet (i.e. where the transport cost is zero).
Due to a general paucity of transport cost data, gravity models typ-
ically include only estimates of distance e¤ects. A notable exception is
that of Limao and Venables (2001), who combine distance estimates from a
gravity model with the transport cost data discussed above, as well as trans-
port data inferred from CIF/FOB comparisons. By combining the di¤erent
sources of data, the authors are able to estimate both (i) the elasticity of
transport costs w.r.t. distance, and (ii) the elasticity of imports w.r.t. dis-
47Without controlling for distance, the mean cost of shipping to a coastal country is
$4,620 and being landlocked adds $3,450. When controlling for distance, being landlocked
still adds $2,170.
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tance. This gives them an implied elasticity of imports w.r.t. transport
costs of around -6.5, implying a large role for transport costs.
A novel approach to estimating the impact of transport costs on trade is
provided by Feyrer (2009), who uses the closure of the Suez canal between
1967 and 1975 as a natural experiment. Although he does not measure
transport costs per se, his methodology exploits changes in distance and
so removes time-invariant factors such as culture. In e¤ect, he provides an
estimate of distance on trade that is more relevant for transport costs. His
estimates are around half that of Head and Mayer (2015).
2.2.3 Conicts and trade
Post-independence Africa has been blighted by civil war, the disastrous con-
sequences of which for economic prosperity are well documented (see e.g.
Collier and Hoe­ er 2007). Bayer and Rupert (2004) estimate the e¤ects of
civil war on international trade (in a global sample) using a gravity model
over the period 1950-1992. The authors nd a substantial impact of civil
war, estimating a reduction in bilateral trade of around a third if either
partner is involved in a civil war. A similar exercise for international con-
icts is undertaken by Glick and Taylor (2010), who extend their coverage
back to 1870 to include the e¤ects of both World Wars. The authors nd
substantially negative and persistent e¤ects of conicts on trade, enduring
for many years after conict has ended.
Compared to the sizeable literature regarding domestic civil wars, re-
search on the externalities of conicts on neighbouring countries is some-
what limited. An early attempt to measure these externalities is that
of Ades and Chua (1997), who run cross-section regressions of economic
growth over the period 1960-1985. The authors nd that high regional in-
stability, measured by the number of revolutions and coups per year, has
a signicant and negative impact on growth. In terms of mechanisms, the
authors nd that regional instability leads to higher military outlays and
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reduced trade ows. In related work, Murdoch and Sandler (2004) exam-
ine the e¤ect of civil wars in neighbouring countries on domestic economic
growth, in the context of a Solow growth model. They nd that countries
in a region with 3 or more civil wars may be equally damaged by the con-
ict (in economic growth terms) as the country experiencing the civil war.
Interestingly however, countries are generally able to limit the impact of
neighbouring civil wars after a couple of years, whereas the host country
experiences increasing harm as the conict continues.
The papers most closely related to mine are those of Milner and Zgovu
(2006) and Qureshi (2013). Milner and Zgovu estimate the relative e¤ects
of trade policy and transport costs on the exports of Malawi, exploiting the
civil war in Mozambique as a natural experiment. The authors estimate an
export supply function for Malawi, and nd transport costs to be a more sig-
nicant determinant of exports than trade policy. Although this is a useful
case study however, it is interesting to consider to what extent the Malaw-
ian experience generalises, and whether instability on transit routes has
negatively a¤ected landlocked countries in the aggregate. Qureshi (2013)
estimates the e¤ect of conicts in neighbouring countries on international
trade in a global sample, using a gravity model over the period 1948-2006.
The author nds signicant negative e¤ects of neighbouring conicts on
bilateral trade, with his principal estimate being that conict in a neigh-
bouring country reduces international trade of the domestic country by
around 8 percent. Despite postulating that transport costs are one of the
key mechanisms driving his results however, the author does not test the
underlying mechanisms. In this paper I specically consider the role of
transport costs and use conicts as a means of deriving estimates for the
e¤ect of transport costs on trade.
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2.3 The Sample
Figure 2.1 maps the major transit routes of each landlocked country.48 To
identify such routes I have consulted a wide literature, and details of both
routes and disruptions are provided in Appendix B.1. Mapping the routes
explicitly provides me with a measure of distance to coast for each alterna-
tive, and will enable me to exploit data on the specic location of civil wars.
For the base road and rail networks I use the Food and Agricultural Organ-
isations Relational World Database II, and navigable rivers are taken from
Natural Earth.49 After identifying the ports and transport modes used by
each landlocked country, detailed in Appendix B.1, I calculate the shortest
route from capital to port using the Network Analyst extension in ArcGIS.
Figure 2.1: Transit routes and civil wars
Throughout the paper I use data on civil wars from two datasets. The
rst is the Correlates of War (COW) database, the most widely used dataset
in the study of conict and economic activity (e.g. Bayer and Rupert 2004,
48Ethiopia and Souh Sudan are not included as they became landlocked countries
during the sample period.
49Available online at http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/main.home and
http://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/50m-physical-vectors/
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Murdoch and Sandler 2004, Collier and Hoe­ er 2007). For inclusion in the
COW database, each year of a conict must result in a minimum of 1,000
battle-related deaths, and there must be "e¤ective opposition" from both
sides. This coding rule ensures that I am capturing only years in which
there is signicant unrest in the a¤ected country.
As a second measure of civil war, I use the PRIO-GRID dataset of the
Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) (Tollefsen et al. 2012).50 PRIO-
GRID geocodes the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset, based on the
location of ghting in each calendar year. Specically, PRIO-GRID divides
the globe into square cells at a resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 decimal degrees, and
conict data is processed at the cell-level rather than country-level.51 This
provides me with a potentially cleaner treatment strategy: when using the
PRIO-GRID data, I can exclude conicts that occur in areas of the transit
country that routes do not pass through.52
Table 2.2 provides details on the frequency and duration of civil wars
in both datasets over the period 1975-2005.53 From the table, it is clear
that civil wars have been extremely common over the period, with the
majority of landlocked countries experiencing a conict on at least one of
their major transit routes. Such conicts are less common in the PRIO-
GRID data, partly as a result of using cell-level data, but largely due to
measurement and methodological di¤erences between the two datasets. As
an example, Cote dIvoire is coded as being in civil war from 2002-2004
in the COW dataset, based on 1,000 or more deaths per year, but not in
the PRIO-GRID dataset. As shown in the table, on average there are an
50For consistency with the COW, I include all episodes from PRIO-GRID classied as
"intense", i.e. those involving 1,000 or more deaths per year.
51Conicts are however constrained to take place in the country listed in the master
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset.
52I use the "intersect" tool in ArcGIS to intersect the PRIO-GRID civil war coordinates
with the transit network shown in Figure 2.1.
53This is the period over which data is available in all the datasets used. In particular,
the transport cost data used in Section 2.4 begins in the early 1970s, with very little data
pre-1975. In the PRIO-GRID dataset I use the confold variable, for which the latest year
is 2005.
61
additional two years of transit conicts per landlocked country in the COW
data.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics - conicts (1975-2005)
Correlates of
War
PRIO-GRID
# countries 14 14
# years 31 31
# countries with a conflict on a transit route 10 7
# countries with a conflict on shortest route 5 4
Mean years with conflict on a transit route (s.d.) 7.86(7.67)
5.71
(6.38)
Mean duration of transit conflict (s.d.) 4.55(4.03)
3.60
(3.69)
2.4 Transport Costs
Do civil wars in transit countries increase transport costs? Figure 2.2 pro-
vides an illustration that they might, by plotting the overseas trade of
Burkina Faso and Malawi transiting through Cote dIvoire and Mozam-
bique (respectively).54 As a result of civil war in Cote dIvoire, the border
with Burkina Faso was closed for an entire year in September 2002. During
the closure merchandise was blocked in the port of Abidjan, and through-
out the conict exporters struggled to insure goods passing through Cote
dIvoire (OECD 2006). Prior to the crisis, Abidjan had also served as the
principal port for Malian exporters, many of whom now transited through
Burkina Faso to ports in Ghana and Togo. The increase in distance alone
was estimated to cost Mali an additional $12 million per year in freight
costs (Briceno-Garmendia et al. 2011).
The 1980s conict in Mozambique disrupted the transit routes of Malawi,
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. As demonstrated in Figure 2.2, Malawis
54I am grateful to Olivier Hartmann at the World Bank for providing the Burkina
Faso data.
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access to both its ports in Mozambique was completely blocked during the
crisis and diversion to South Africa (via Zimbabwe) increased distances by
almost 2,500 km. Freight costs on the South African route were around
3 times higher than those through Mozambique (World Bank 1988), and
Kennedy (1988) estimates additional transport costs in the region of $100
million per year. For the other landlocked countries, passage through
Mozambique was still possible although subject to terrorist attacks, derail-
ments, long closures, and a reduction in rail and port capacity (Kennedy
1988, World Bank 1989). Zimbabwean and Zambian transit was guarded
by government troops, although sabotage still occurred and access to the
southern port of Maputo was closed completely in 1984. In the case of
Zambia, access to ports in Mozambique had also been completely blocked
during the civil war in Zimbabwe (1973-1979), in which the border between
Zambia and Zimbabwe was closed (Hoyle and Charlier 1995).
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Figure 2.2: Transport disruptions, Burkina Faso and Malawi
To quantify the aggregate e¤ect of civil wars on transport costs, I collect
data on freight and insurance expenditure from IMF Balance of Payments
(BOP) statistics. As noted by Hummels (2007), international trade econo-
mists typically measure transport costs in ad valorem terms: the cost of
freight and insurance relative to the value of the good. Recent research has
demonstrated however that non-pecuniary transport costs delays and un-
reliability may be just as important for trade (Arvis et al. 2010, Djankov
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et al. 2006). The examples above demonstrate that conicts on transit
routes are likely to inuence both types of cost, although quantifying the
non-pecuniary e¤ects is challenging. To the extent that delays and unrelia-
bility are reected in higher insurance premiums, the ad valorem transport
cost will capture such e¤ects. It is likely nevertheless that the ad valorem
cost may be underestimating the overall impact of conicts on the costs of
transport.
I approximate an ad valorem transport cost for country i in time t by di-
viding payments on foreign freight and insurance services by the combined
value of imports and exports of goods. To clarify, the numerator consists
of expenditure by domestic residents on both freight servicesand insur-
ance servicesprovided by foreign residents. The latter includes not only
freight insurance, but also life, health and other types of insurance. If con-
icts in transit countries increase expenditures on types of insurance other
than freight, this will bias the e¤ect of conict on transport costs upwards.
I therefore present results for both the combined transport cost measure
(freight services and insurance services), and for both types of service sep-
arately.
As noted by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), transport costs are
almost always assumed to be log-linear in distance. I present results for
both linear and log-level forms in Appendix B.2, but in the log-linear case
we have:
ln(tit) =  + 1Tit + 2 ln(distit) + i + t + "it (17)
where tit is the ad valorem transport cost of country i at time t, Tit is
a dummy equal to 1 if there is a conict on a major transit route, distit is
the distance (km) to the nearest port, and i and t are country and time
xed-e¤ects.55 Due to the country xed e¤ects, all variation in distance
55When using COW data, Tit =1 if there is a civil war in any neighbouring country
that the landlocked countrys transit routes cross. When using PRIO-GRID data, Tit
=1 if there is a civil war in any of the 0.5 x 0.5 decimal degree cells (in neighbouring
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is caused by conicts on transit routes. Specically, changes in distance
are calculated as the di¤erence in distance (if any) between the route on
which there is a conict and the next-shortest alternative. This di¤erence
is non-negative: a conict may increase the distance to coast, or leave it
unchanged.
The regression includes both a conict dummy Tit, and the continuous
distance variable distit. The two variables are correlated over time because
distit changes only when Tit = 1. The rationale for including both variables
is that Tit captures the incidence of conict on a transit route, and distit
captures the intensity of conict on a transit route. It is not clear ex
ante whether all conicts are damaging, or only those that increase the
distance to coast. The incidence variable Tit tests for this in the regressions,
because it picks up the e¤ect of conict when distance is controlled for (by
the inclusion of the distit variable). The results in fact show that it is
distance that is the important variable rather than Tit: conicts that do
not increase the distance to coast do not appear to damage landlocked
countriestransport costs or trade.56
In practice, conicts do not necessarily block transit routes completely.
Even when there is a conict on the shortest route to coast, there is generally
still some transit tra¢ c. Distance is therefore to some extent capturing the
shortest optimal route rather than the shortest possible route. Further,
even if transit through a conict zone is feasible, there are good reasons to
expect both freight and insurance costs to increase in the distance variable.
Firstly, we know from the examples above that many rms do change route
as a result of conicts, and for such rms freight costs will be higher when
the outside option is further away (due to variable costs such as fuel and
labour). Secondly, a more distant alternative port makes it more likely
that rms will continue to transit via the original route (if possible), thus
countries) that the landlocked countrys transit routes cross.
56The inclusion of T in the regressions has little e¤ect on the dist coe¢ cients, al-
though they generally become more signicant if T is excluded. Similarly, T remains
insignicant if dist is omitted.
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increasing insurance costs.
A general issue with the empirical strategy is that there is limited vari-
ation in the distit variable. As shown in Table 2.2, 5 countries su¤ered a
conict on their shortest route during the period. These were Malawi (1979-
1992), Mali (2002-2004), Swaziland (1979-1992), Zambia (1972-1992) and
Zimbabwe (1979-1992). The Mozambique conict accounts for a number
of these cases; Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe (although Zam-
bia was also a¤ected by the earlier conict in Zimbabwe). As a number of
countries su¤ered from the same conict, there may be common unobserved
e¤ects that are not captured. To account for this I have experimented with
clustering standard errors at the regional level, as suggested in Cameron et
al. (2015), although there is little e¤ect on the main results (in which stan-
dard errors are clustered by country).57 The general lack of variation in the
dataset however means that the regressions are based on a rather limited
number of cases, and the results should therefore be interpreted with some
caution.
Table 2.3 presents the results of equation (17) for the landlocked coun-
tries over 1975-2005. Columns (1) to (3) use the COW conict dates and
columns (4) to (6) use those from PRIO-GRID. As transport costs are gen-
erally declining over the period, I include a country-specic time trend in
Panel B. The time trend substantially reduces a number of the coe¢ cients,
although the e¤ect of distance on transport costs remains positive and sig-
nicant in both panels. It is notable that the incidence of civil war (Tit) is
insignicant in all specications, whereas the "intensity" of civil war - cap-
57As a given conict a¤ects a number of landlocked countries within the region, this
could be viewed as a situation in which there is a regional level treatment, but country-
level data. Cameron et al (2015) suggest clustering standard errors at the regional level
in such cases. I have experimented with this by creating 4 regional groups - West, East,
Central and South. Most of the main results are not a¤ected, although some of the
coe¢ cients in the regressions including a time-trend become insignicant. In the main
results I have clustered at country level as the treatment is not truly regional - even if
a number of countries are a¤ected by the same conict, the changes in distance to the
coast are very di¤erent across di¤erent countries.
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tured by ln(distit) - is positive and highly signicant. This suggests that
the impact of transit country civil wars is limited provided that the land-
locked country has good outside options. If the outside options are weak,
and civil wars cause a diversion to much longer routes, transport costs will
rise signicantly.
With the time-trend, the coe¢ cients in columns (1) and (4) suggest an
elasticity of transport costs w.r.t. distance in the range 0.27 to 0.42. The
upper bound is pulled up somewhat by the large increases in insurance
premiums; using freight charges alone suggests an upper bound of 0.34.
Such estimates are strikingly similar to those of Hummels (2001), often used
as benchmark gures (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop 2004). Hummels
nds elasticities of 0.39 for rail distances and 0.28 for road distances using
US Census Bureau data.
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Table 2.3: Transport costs and conict (1975-2005)
Panel A: No time trend
Correlates of War PRIO-GRID
(1)
ln(t)
(2)
ln(fr.)
(3)
ln(ins.)
(4)
ln(t)
(5)
ln(fr.)
(6)
ln(ins.)
T -0.152 -0.225 0.069 0.137 0.027 0.376
(0.211) (0.205) (0.307) (0.148) (0.138) (0.381)
ln(dist) 0.787*** 0.779*** 1.289*** 0.452*** 0.513*** 0.847***
(0.163) (0.166) (0.307) (0.106) (0.104) (0.274)
Obs. 342 359 342 342 359 342
Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
R-Sq. 0.28 0.19 0.38 0.22 0.15 0.34
Panel B: Linear time trend
Correlates of War PRIO-GRID
(1)
ln(t)
(2)
ln(fr.)
(3)
ln(ins.)
(4)
ln(t)
(5)
ln(fr.)
(6)
ln(ins.)
T -0.159 -0.255 0.078 -0.052 -0.181 0.173
(0.181) (0.197) (0.265) (0.176) (0.195) (0.356)
ln(dist) 0.416** 0.342* 0.854** 0.265** 0.287** 0.564*
(0.151) (0.168) (0.285) (0.121) (0.130) (0.277)
Obs. 342 359 342 342 359 342
Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
R-Sq. 0.48 0.39 0.50 0.47 0.38 0.47
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
The dependent variables are ad valorem transport costs (columns 1 and 4), ad valorem freight costs
(columns 2 and 5) and ad valorem insurance costs (columns 3 and 6). Constants are included but not
reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.5 Trade
Having established the e¤ect of transit civil wars on transport costs, and
the central role that distance plays in this relationship, it is natural to apply
this to a gravity model of trade. Africa provides a suitable environment for
this strategy, as most external trade is conducted with countries outside the
continent. As noted by Collier and Gunning (1999) above, Africa is unique
in that neighbouring countries are as much an obstacle as a market; I now
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investigate what happens to trade when these obstacles increase. I run a
gravity equation given by:
ln(tradeijt) = 0 + 1Tit + 2 ln(distijt) +X
0
ijt + ij + t + uijt (18)
where tradeijt is the average value of trade between countries i and
j in year t, Tit is dened as before, distijt is the distance between i and
j in year t, Xijt is a vector of controls (GDP of i and j; a dummy = 1
if either i or j is at civil war in year t; plus a lag of this variable), and
ij is a xed e¤ect for each pair. Inclusion of the xed e¤ect controls
for time-invariant factors that are known to a¤ect trade ows including
common language and colonial ties. Inclusion of this term also means that
all variation in distance is caused by conicts on transit routes: changes in
distance to coast are calculated exactly as in Section 2.4, and to generate
bilateral distances I add the sea distance between country i and country j
using data from www.sea-distances.org. The strategy in equation (18) is
thus to treat changes in distance, resulting from neighbouring civil wars, as
exogenous shocks and estimate the response of trade. Having also estimated
the response of transport costs to these shocks, I can then back-out (in
section 2.6) the implied elasticity of trade w.r.t. transport costs.
Equation (18) is run over the period 1975-2005 using IMF Direction of
Trade (DOT) statistics. This dataset provides annual bilateral trade ows
in nominal $US, which I normalise to $1985 using the US CPI deator.
I include all observations for which one member of the pair is an African
landlocked country and the other is located outside Sub-Saharan Africa.
Because I use sea distances, all partner countries are coastal. To exclude
very small economies, whose trade reports are extremely volatile, I exclude
all partner countries with populations below 1 million in 1990. The results
are not sensitive to this decision, and in Appendix B.3 I present a number
of robustness checks: modifying the list of transit routes; adding measures
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of "openness"; including very small partner countries; and using great circle
instead of sea distances.
Table 2.4 presents the results of equation (18). Columns (1) and (2) are
based on the full sample, and columns (3) and (4) are essentially robustness
checks ((5) to (8) replicate (1) to (4) using the PRIO-GRID data). To check
that extreme distances are not driving the results, column (3) excludes
all observations in which bilateral distance is greater than two standard
deviations above or below the mean. Because most of the variation in
distance is caused by the Mozambican conict of the 1980s, column (4)
limits the sample to a shorter period by excluding observations beyond 2000.
In all specications except columns (5) and (8), the distance term enters
negatively and signicantly.58 It is notable that - particularly for the COW
estimates - the coe¢ cient is slightly larger than previous estimates. In their
meta-analysis of gravity models, Head and Mayer (2015) nd a mean e¤ect
of -1.1, although in the related literature somewhat higher upper estimates
are common: -1.69 (Limao and Venables 2001), -1.38 (Glick and Taylor
2010) and -1.36 (Qureshi 2013).
58The term is highly signicant in both columns if small partner countries are not
excluded.
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Table 2.4: Trade and conict (1975-2005)
Correlates of War PRIO-GRID
(1)
ln(trade)
(2)
ln(trade)
(3)
ln(trade)
(4)
ln(trade)
(5)
ln(trade)
(6)
ln(trade)
(7)
ln(trade)
(8)
ln(trade)
T -0.028 0.015 -0.019 0.039 0.034 0.065 0.022 0.082
(0.079) (0.081) (0.083) (0.088) (0.097) (0.097) (0.099) (0.100)
ln(dist) -1.606* -1.980** -1.670** -1.420** -1.225 -1.628** -1.305* -0.921
(0.832) (0.783) (0.780) (0.692) (0.791) (0.724) (0.721) (0.656)
ln(Yit) -0.016 0.003 -0.083 -0.036 -0.018 -0.083
(0.115) (0.114) (0.118) (0.115) (0.114) (0.119)
ln(Yjt) 0.393*** 0.397*** 0.292** 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.309**
(0.132) (0.133) (0.144) (0.132) (0.133) (0.144)
Conflict -0.277*** -0.311*** -0.296*** -0.283*** -0.314*** -0.301***
(0.086) (0.089) (0.091) (0.085) (0.088) (0.090)
Conflict+1 -0.457*** -0.493*** -0.419*** -0.454*** -0.499*** -0.420***
(0.089) (0.091) (0.100) (0.089) (0.092) (0.100)
Obs. 23,972 21,405 20,285 16,871 23,972 21,403 20,283 16,874
Pairs 1,101 1,046 983 979 1,101 1,047 984 979
R-sq. 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include pair and year fixed effects.
Column (3) excludes very short and long distances, and column (4) covers only 1975-2000. Columns (5) to (8) replicate
(1) to (4) using the PRIO-GRID definition of conflicts. Constants are included but not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.5.1 Spillovers
A limitation of the empirical approach is that there may be other spillovers
from neighbouring conicts - in addition to higher transport costs - that
also reduce trade. This would bias the results, as we would be attributing
the impact of such factors to transport costs. Ades and Chua (1997) for
example nd that regional instability increases domestic military spending.
If such spending is nanced through higher taxation, or (more generally)
raises domestic interest rates, this could reduce investment and hurt ex-
ports. Alternatively it may be the case the violence itself spills across the
border, provoking domestic unrest and reducing economic activity. Such
factors would also generate a correlation between neighbouring conicts
and trade, but not due to the transport cost channel that is of particular
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interest here.
The fact that my results are driven by the dist variable, rather than the
incidence of neighbouring conicts (T ) per se, limits such concerns. The
results suggest that trade declines signicantly only when the distance to the
coast increases. This result supports the view that an increase in transport
costs is the causal mechanism. Nevertheless, in Table 2.5 I explicitly check
for these "crowding out" spillovers. Columns (1) to (4) present results from
regressions of government consumption, military spending, tax revenues
and the real interest rate on the transit conict (T ) and dist variables used
above.59 It can be seen in each of the four columns that any crowding out
e¤ects are largely absent (although the tax data is extremely limited).
As a further test that transport costs are driving the results, I check
(i) whether the trade of coastal countries is a¤ected by these neighbouring
civil wars, and (ii) whether landlocked trade is a¤ected by civil wars in
"non-transit" neighbouring countries. The results are presented in columns
(5) and (6). Although the incidence of neighbouring conicts (T ) enters
negatively, it is extremely small and insignicant in both columns. The
results do not rule out the importance of other spillovers altogether, but
they do provide further evidence that the trade e¤ects work via transport
shocks rather than other trade-related spillovers.
59Government spending (general government nal consumption expenditure), tax rev-
enues and the real interest rate are all from the World Bank World Development In-
dicators. Tax revenue data is not available pre-1990. Military spending is from the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and is available from 1988.
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Table 2.5: Other conict spillovers
(1)
ln(gov.)
(2)
ln(mil.)
(3)
ln(tax)
(4)
r
(5)
ln(trade)
(6)
ln(trade)
T 0.159 0.077 -0.699 0.000 -0.026 -0.075
(0.146) (0.163) (0.518) (0.063) (0.049) (0.059)
ln(dist) 0.093 0.013 -2.651 -0.084
(0.126) (0.192) (2.814) (0.122)
Obs. 424 214 75 313 67,243 27,423
Countries 14 14 10 13 3,305 1,374
R-Sq. 0.139 0.189 0.782 0.194 0.01 0.02
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) to (4) include country and year fixed effects,
columns (5) and (6) include bilateral pair and year fixed effects.
The dependent variables are general government consumption (column 1), military spending (column
2), tax revenues (column 3), the real interest rate (column 4), and bilateral trade (columns 4 and 5).
Constants are included but not reported.
2.6 Calibration
2.6.1 Implied elasticities
It is useful to bring together the results of the previous two sections, to
consider their implications for the responsiveness of trade to transport costs.
Table 2.6 collects my estimates of the elasticities of transport costs and
trade to distance, from Tables 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. I can then calculate
the elasticity of trade with respect to transport costs as the ratio of the
two (column 2 / column 1). For comparison, I provide estimates from
elsewhere that are often used as benchmark gures. Head and Mayer (2015)
is based on an extensive meta-analysis of distance e¤ects, and Hummels
(2001) exploits very detailed US Census Bureau data to compute transport
costs.60 Feyrer (2009) is an interesting comparison to the present paper,
as it too is computed from changes in distance (as opposed to the more
common static measure).
60The US Census Bureau data is not suitable for my purposes as transport costs
are calculated "free-alongside-ship". Any changes in overland transport costs in Africa
should not a¤ect such a measurement (see Amjadi & Yeats 1995).
74
Table 2.6: Implied elasticities
Estimated elasticity w.r.t. distance Implied elasticity of
trade w.r.t. transport
costs
Transport costs Trade
This paper (COW) 0.42 -1.42 (lower)-1.98 (upper)
-3.38 (lower)
-4.71 (upper)
This paper (PRIO-GRID) 0.27 -0.92 (lower)-1.63 (upper)
-3.41 (lower)
-6.04 (upper)
Head & Mayer (2015) +
Hummels (2001) 0.28 (road)0.39 (rail)
-1.1 -3.93 (road)
-2.82 (rail)
Feyrer (2009) +
Hummels (2001) 0.22 (sea) -0.46 -2.09
My estimates suggest that trade is slightly more responsive to transport
costs than in previous papers, as shown in the nal column. This may well
be due to my sample selection, based purely on landlocked African trade
ows. The exports of such countries are based overwhelmingly on pri-
mary commodities, with the limited manufacturing exports being in highly
competitive sectors.61 Radelet and Sachs (1998) argue that most develop-
ing countriesmanufactured exports face perfectly elastic demand, and a
similar case holds for most primary commodities (in which the landlocked
countries are price takers). With such export proles, it is reasonable to ex-
pect an elastic response of trade to transport costs for a developing country
sample.
61UN Comtrade data for 1990 shows that 82% of the exports of Acan landlocked
countries were primary commodities. Just 1% was "machinery" (capital goods, SITC
code 7) and 14% was in other manufacturing sectors (using the Radelet & Sachs (1998)
denition minus machinery).
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2.6.2 Lost trade
In this section I calibrate the value of trade that the landlocked countries
have lost over the period due to conicts in transit countries. The method-
ology is based on that of Glick and Taylor (2010) and makes use of the
estimations in Table 2.4. The idea is to identify a "benchmark" level of
trade between i and j that would have occurred in the absence of conict
in a transit country; this will be denoted as tradeijo. I can then use the
estimates in Table 2.4 to compute the implied level of trade in the presence
of such conicts (denoted by tradeCij). The implied level of trade between
countries i and j in year t is given by:
tradeCij = tradeijo
 
distCij
distij
!2
(19)
where distij is the normal distance between i and j, distCij is the dis-
tance during a conict, and 2 is the coe¢ cient from equation (18). Glick
and Taylor (2010) follow a similar approach, in which they calibrate the
value of lost trade as a result of World Wars I and II.62 For tradeijo the
authors choose the level of trade in the year immediately preceding war,
i.e. 1913 for World War I and 1938 for World War II. I make an analogous
assumption, although I account for the fact that Zimbabwe su¤ered from
an internal conict preceding the Mozambican war, meaning that an alter-
native benchmark should be chosen for Zimbabwe. I therefore choose the
year immediately preceding Zimbabwes internal conict as the benchmark
year in that case.
When there is a conict on a transit route, the volume of lost trade
between countries i and j in year t is given by tradeijo tradeCij. To calculate
the total volume of lost trade for landlocked country i, I sum across all
partner countries j, and then across all years of conicts in transit countries.
62Glick and Taylor do not rely on changes in distance, but rather dummy variables for
the presence of war. Hence their expression for tradeCij is somewhat di¤erent.
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To calculate a total gure for the volume of lost trade, I then sum across
all a¤ected landlocked countries.
Two questions are of particular interest:
1. How much higher would landlocked trade have been in the absence of
conicts in transit countries?
2. What percentage of the "landlocked penalty" - the gap between (per
capita) landlocked and coastal trade volumes - is accounted for by
these conicts?
Table 2.7 presents answers to these questions, based on the upper and
lower bound elasticities of trade w.r.t. distance from Table 2.4. In all cases,
trade losses are notably higher using the COW data, primarily due to the
higher number of years classied as conict in this dataset (see Table 2.2).
The upper bound estimates using COW suggest that (1) international trade
of landlocked African countries would have been almost 12 percent higher
in the absence of conicts in transit countries, and (2) around 10 percent
of the "landlocked penalty" is due to such conicts.
Even accounting for such losses, international trade (per capita) of
coastal countries would still have been twice as high as for landlocked coun-
tries over the period. It is worth noting however that I am measuring only
the contemporaneous loss in trade due to such conicts. There may be sig-
nicant longer term implications that I am not capturing. The likelihood of
future shocks of this kind may reduce investment in the landlocked countries
for example: conicts in transit countries add an additional degree of risk.
Again, this uncertainty is unique to landlocked countries, and quantifying
it may help to explain a larger proportion of the "landlocked penalty".
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Table 2.7: The volume of lost trade (1975-2005)
Correlates of War PRIO-GRID
Volume of landlocked trade $189.11 bn $189.11 bn
Volume of landlocked trade (per capita) $1968 $1968
Volume of coastal trade (per capita) $4276 $4276
Lost trade (lower) $15.88 bn $5.46 bn
Lost trade (upper) $21.88 bn $8.78 bn
% higher trade if no transit conflicts 8.4% (lower)11.6% (upper)
2.9% (lower)
4.6% (upper)
% of landlocked penalty due to transit conflicts 7.2% (lower)9.9% (upper)
2.5% (lower)
4.0% (upper)
All values are in $1985 and are calculated using Direction of Trade Statistics. The “lost trade” figures exclude sub-
Saharan African and landlocked partner countries, as in Table 4. For consistency, trade volumes are calculated
analogously.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that landlocked countries are adversely a¤ected
by instability in their transit neighbours. When such neighbours are in
conict, the cost of accessing international markets increases. Based on
changes in the distance to coast caused by these conicts, I estimate an
elasticity of transport costs w.r.t. distance in the range 0.27 to 0.42. Using
the same strategy, I then estimate an elasticity of trade w.r.t. distance in
the range -0.92 to -1.98. Together, these gures imply an elasticity of trade
w.r.t. transport costs in the range -3.38 to -6.04. Such a range suggests
quite an elastic trade response. I argue that the export proles of African
landlocked countries - concentrated in primary commodities and low value
manufactured goods - helps explain this result.
Secondly, I quantify the costs of such conicts for the African landlocked
countries themselves. Over the period 1975-2005, I nd that international
trade could otherwise have been 12 percent higher. Although substantial,
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this lost trade would only account for around 10 percent of the "landlocked
penalty" - the di¤erence in per capita trade volumes between coastal and
landlocked countries. International trade of the landlocked countries would
still have been just half that of the coastal countries over the period.
These low trade volumes present di¢ cult policy choices. As there are
minimum tra¢ c thresholds for competitive logistics services, it may be op-
timal for transit tra¢ c to be concentrated on particular routes (Arvis et
al. 2011). On the other hand, diversifying routes can promote competition
amongst neighbours, reducing the administrative costs of transit. This pa-
per provides an additional motivation for diversifying routes to the coast:
conict in coastal neighbours has limited e¤ect when there are good outside
options. It may indeed be optimal for certain "regional routes" to develop,
but maintaining viable alternatives remains essential.
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3 Regulation, renegotiation and capital struc-
ture: Theory and evidence from Latin Amer-
ican transport concessions
Abstract
We examine why private infrastructure providers rely so heavily on
debt nancing. We concentrate on a particular hypothesis, that debt is
used to gain higher regulated prices. If this is true, we expect debt to
be lower under price cap regulation, as the price incentive for debt is
diminished. We present a model that derives this result. To test this
we create a panel dataset of 124 transport concessions in Brazil, Chile,
Colombia and Peru over 1992-2011. We have data on nancial struc-
ture, regulatory design and contract renegotiations. We provide support-
ive evidence that price cap regulation reduces leverage, all else equal.63
Co-authored with Jean-Jacques Dethier (World Bank) and Stephane
Straub (Toulouse School of Economics)
63We thank Lorena Lizarazo for excellent research assistance. We thank OSITRAN
(Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión en Infraestructura de Transporte de Uso Público)
in Perú, ANI (Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura) in Colombia, Luis Guasch and
Alexander Galetovic for sharing data. We are grateful to Lincoln Flor and Camila Ro-
driguez for providing advice and contacts. We thank Jane Ansell, Tim Besley, Philippe
Gagnepain, Marian Moszoro, Marcia Schafgans and participants at the Workshop on
Procurement and Infrastructure in Toulouse, the Chaire EPPP Conference on Con-
tracts, Procurement and Public-Private Arrangements in Florence and the Financing
Infrastructure in Crisis Times workshop in Paris for helpful comments and suggestions.
This chapter is a modied version of that appearing in the Journal of Regulatory Eco-
nomics (2014) 45: 209-232.
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3.1 Introduction
Since the 1990s public private partnerships (PPPs) and concession contracts
have been widely used to develop major infrastructure projects. In emerg-
ing and developing economies private infrastructure investments, largely
promoted by the World Bank, have grown by over 700 percent since 1990.64
One of the striking features of these investments is that they are largely
nanced through debt. Leverage, dened here as the ratio of liabilities
to assets, is typically over 70 percent for infrastructure rms.65 There is
increasing alarm amongst many analysts over the sustainability of such in-
debtedness: Helm and Tindall (2009) have warned of "nancial corpses" in
the UK and The Economist (2011) of "nancial zombies" in India.
There are two principal, competing views over the motivation for high
leverage in infrastructure projects. The rst view, widely held at the World
Bank, is that investors prefer as much debt as possible, and will maximise
leverage subject only to nding willing creditors. The World Bank Insti-
tutes (2012) PPP Reference Guide for example states that "because equity
is regarded as more expensive than debt, project sponsors often try to use a
high proportion of debt to nance the project" (p.46). Similarly, Farquhar-
son et al. (2011), also published by the World Bank, argue that "equity
investment is "rst in, last out" ... it follows from this that equity invest-
ment has a higher risk than debt, and so equity investors expect a higher
return for this risk. Since equity is therefore more expensive than debt, the
more debt a project can raise, the lower its overall funding costs will be"
(p.53).
As noted by Ehrhardt and Irwin (2004) however, this argument (taken
at face value) is at odds with the Modigliani-Miller theorem: higher debt
means higher risk, and so rational equity holders will require higher re-
64Based on data from the World Bank PPI database, normalised to constant $US.
65To put this into context, Esty (2003) shows that the median leverage of similarly-
sized rms is 31 percent in the Compustat database, and almost almost 30 percent of
listed rms have a leverage ratio below 5 percent.
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turns. Therefore higher leverage does not automatically lower the cost of
capital. The "World Bank view" is thus unconvincing unless there are
some frictions that cause debt to be genuinely cheaper (from an investors
perspective) than equity. Ehrhardt and Irwin (2004) argue that this often
occurs as a result of government policy discriminating in favour of debt,
such as guaranteeing debt repayments but not equity returns and provid-
ing minimum revenue guarantees linked to the repayment of debt. In such
cases debt would have a genuine cost advantage over equity, and as noted by
Yescombe (2007), the rm would increase the proportion of debt up to the
point at which this cost saving is completely o¤set by the increasing threat
of bankruptcy. The "World Bank view" can therefore be seen as analogous
to the static trade-o¤ theory of capital structure: less risky projects have
a lower risk of bankruptcy and will therefore have higher leverage. Based
on this, we would expect more protable rms with less volatile revenue
streams to have higher leverage, and leverage to increase as bond markets
develop (as supply side constraints are relaxed).
The second view is that rms use debt to extract higher prices from
the regulator. If the regulator is averse to bankruptcy, it may increase
prices when leverage is high. The regulator may fear service disruption
for example (Ehrhardt and Irwin 2004), or wish to avoid sending negative
signals to potential investors. Supportive evidence for this has come from
both the United States (Dasgupta and Nanda 1993, Spiegel and Spulber
1994) and Europe (Bortolotti et al. 2011, Cambini and Spiegel 2011). This
motivation may be even stronger in an emerging market context, where
regulatory commitment is weak. Esty (2003) argues that rms use leverage
to enforce contracts with the regulator, noting that "in the presence of
high leverage, even small attempts to appropriate value will result in costly
default" (pp.15-16).
In this paper we assess these competing arguments in an emerging mar-
ket context. We focus on the second, "strategic" argument, due to its
implications for regulated prices. We rst extend the theoretical model of
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Spiegel and Spulber (1994), to show that the rms ability to inuence regu-
lated prices is determined by the design of regulation. Under high-powered
regulation, such as price cap, prices are unresponsive to the probability of
bankruptcy, reducing the rms incentive to use leverage. Similarly, when
the cost of debt increases, we predict that rms operating under price cap
will reduce their debt more than those operating under lower-powered reg-
ulation (such as rate-of-return). We take these predictions to the data to
test the validity of the "strategic" motivation for leverage.
To do so, we create a unique panel dataset of 124 transport concessions
in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru over 1992-2011. We collect annual
nancial data for each rm, much of which is sourced directly from the reg-
ulators. To test the role of regulatory design on leverage, we have details
on the regulation of every project. This is sourced from project contracts,
legislation and renegotiation agreements. Renegotiation is very common in
our sample, and potentially undermines the formal regulatory design. For
our purposes, if a rm can renegotiate whenever it is in nancial di¢ culty,
then the incentive to use leverage will not vary across di¤erent types of
regulation. That is, even under high-powered regulation the rm can in-
crease prices by using high leverage.66 We therefore explicitly test whether
nancial performance is a signicant determinant of renegotiation. We nd
no evidence of this, allowing us to use the project contracts as our main
source of regulatory information.
To test the role of regulatory design on leverage, we create a dummy
equal to 1 if the rm is regulated by price cap. We begin by running panel
regressions with country and sector xed e¤ects, nding the e¤ect of price
cap on leverage to be insignicant. To deal with the likely endogeneity
of regulation, we next analyse how leverage responds within projects to
changes in the cost of debt. As predicted by the model, we nd some
evidence that price cap rms make larger reductions in leverage when the
66This is analogous to the earlier argument of Esty (2003) that imperfect regulatory
commitment increases the incentive for leverage.
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cost of debt increases. This provides support to the hypothesis that rms
use leverage to inuence regulatory prices.
Our results are perhaps most striking in how little support they provide
to the "World Bank view" that rms simply maximise leverage (subject
to nding willing creditors). We nd for example that higher protabil-
ity, which increases debt availability by lowering bankruptcy risk, actually
reduces leverage.67 Additionally, rms signicantly reduce leverage as na-
tional stock markets develop. Bond market development appears to have
no e¤ect. Contrary to the World Bank view, our results therefore suggest
that supply-side constraints are stronger with regards to equity than debt.
The paper makes two further contributions. The rst is data. Due
to the development of project nance, and the creation of special purpose
vehicles (SPVs) or "project companies", the rms of interest in infrastruc-
ture projects are almost always unlisted and so very little nancial data
is publicly available. Very little is therefore known regarding the nancial
structure of such rms, or what motivates these structures.68 Secondly,
we contribute to the literature on PPP renegotiations (e.g. Guasch 2004,
Engel et al. 2006) by providing the rst evidence on the role of nancial
performance in triggering renegotiations. Our results are more favourable
to the regulators than some previous studies have been (e.g. Sirtaine et
al. 2005). We nd that contracts are not systematically renegotiated when
rms are in nancial di¢ culty, and regulators do a better job in enforcing
price caps than sometimes recognised.
To summarise, this paper analyses original and rare data on the nances
of private infrastructure providers. We show that the data supports the ar-
gument that infrastructure providers use debt to inuence regulated prices.
67This result is more consistent with the pecking order theory of capital structure
(Myers 1984).
68Researchers interesting in the nancing of PPPS and concessions have typically relied
on the snapshot information available at "nancial close". In this project we have sourced
much of our data directly from regulators, allowing us to generate time-series variation
within rms.
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In particular, under a price cap regime prices should be less responsive to
debt, and so the rms incentive to use debt is weakened. We indeed nd ev-
idence that rms regulated through price cap have less preference for debt.
We further show that an alternative argument, in which all infrastructure
providers have a strong preference for debt over equity, has little support
in the data.
3.2 Theory
The objective of the model is to provide comparative statics regarding the
e¤ect of price regulation incentives on the capital structure of the regulated
rm. We do so in a simple model that describes the debt-issuing decision
of a rm reacting to a pre-announced price setting rule, in a framework
inspired by Spiegel and Spulber (1994) and Cambini and Spiegel (2011).
After presenting our main results, we discuss how they extend to a situation
in which the price setting rule can be renegotiated.
Our principal divergence from Spiegel and Spulber (1994) and Cambini
and Spiegel (2011) is in the formulation of the price setting mechanism.
Both of the above papers work in the context of US-style regulation, in
which the regulator has considerable discretion to change prices at regular
intervals. In our Latin American context, details on the mechanisms for
adjusting and revising tari¤s are typically specied in project contracts,
and so regulatory discretion in many cases is very limited. Thus in the
absence of formal renegotiations, which we consider explicitly below, the
price setting rule is pre-announced.
3.2.1 The model
Consider a setting in which a regulator commits ex ante to set the price p
according to a price setting rule of the form p = a + (1   b)C, where C is
expected cost and the parameter b[0; 1] represents the power of incentives.
When b is close to 1, the rule comes close to a xed price contract, i.e.
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a high-powered regulatory rule, while the smaller b, the more responsive
prices are to costs, as in a cost-plus contract.
The rm faces a unit demand function and its cost is a¤ected by a
random shock c uniformly distributed over [0; c], capturing either cost (input
prices) or technology contingencies. The rm must invest an amount K, for
which it issues a level of debt D and equity E. Hence the rms investment
constraint is given by:
K = E +D (20)
Ex post, D must be repaid using the net payo¤ p c. If this falls short of
D, the rm su¤ers a cost of nancial distress T , assumed xed for simplicity.
As in Cambini and Spiegel (2011) we assume that external investors (debt
holders and new shareholders) are eventually paid in full, and so existing
shareholders are responsible for bankruptcy costs T in the case of nancial
distress. Denote by '(p;D) the probability that the rm nds itself in such
a situation, so that its expected cost is C = c
2
+ '(p;D)T .
Equation (21) shows the rms expected total cost C. When the regu-
lated price p is greater than D + c (where c is the maximum possible cost
shock), bankruptcy never occurs. As a result, the expected cost is simply c
2
.
Analogously, if p < D then bankruptcy is inevitable regardless of the size of
the cost shock c. Only in the intermediate case, in which D  p  c+D, is
bankruptcy uncertain. In this case, the probability of bankruptcy is given
by Pr(p   c) < D, and as p is determined ex ante, this is equivalent to
Pr(c) > p   D = 1 Pr(c) < p   D. As c  U [0; c], the probability of
bankruptcy is therefore given by 1  (p D)
c
.
C =
8>><>>:
c
2
c
2
+
 
1  p D
c

T
c
2
+ T
if
if
if
D + c  p;
D  p  c+D;
p < D:
9>>=>>; (21)
The timing is as follows. An exogenous price setting rule of the form
p = a + (1   b)C is announced at stage 0. In stage 1, the regulated rm
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invests K and chooses its capital structure by issuing an amount of debt
D and equity E. At stage 2, given the pre-announced price rule, the rms
cost is revealed, and output and payo¤s are realised.
As in Spiegel and Spulber (1994) and Cambini and Spiegel (2011) we
assume that the rms management acts so as to maximize the payo¤ of
existing shareholders. Hence, the managements objective is to choose the
mix of debt D and equity E so as to maximise:
Y (D) = p(D)  C  REE  RDD s.t. K = E +D (22)
where RE  1 + rE is the cost of equity and RD  1 + rD is the cost of
debt. Due to our assumption that existing shareholders remain the residual
claimants in the case of nancial distress, perfect capital markets and risk
neutral investors imply RE = RD. We relax this below.
From the expected cost C given in equation (21), we can derive the
implied regulated prices using the price setting rule p = a + (1   b)C. In
the rst case, in which bankruptcy never occurs, C = c
2
and so p = p1 =
a + (1   b) c
2
. This is the situation whenever D < p   c
2
, and so the price
is constant at p1 until debt reaches the level at which D = p1   c. This
level of debt is denoted by D1. The other extreme, in which bankruptcy is
inevitable, is analogous. Bankruptcy is inevitable whenever D > p, and so
the implied price is constant in this range at p = p3 = a + (1  b)

c
2
+ T

.
In the intermediate range, the price responds to the threat of bankruptcy,
which increases in the chosen level of debt D. The level of debt in this
intermediate range is such that bankruptcy is neither impossible (D < p c)
nor inevitable (D > p). This is demonstrated in equation (23).
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p(D) =
8>><>>:
p1 = a+ (1  b) c2
p2 = a+ (1  b)

c
2
+
 
1  p D
c

T

p3 = a+ (1  b)

c
2
+ T

if
if
if
D < D1;
D1  D  D2;
D2 < D;
9>>=>>;
(23)
where D1 = p1   c, D2 = p3, D1 < D2, and p1 < p2 < p3. Figure 3.1
shows how p(D) varies with D.
Figure 3.1 The regulated price as a function of debt
Note that the implied price p, determined by the ex-ante price setting
rule, is a function of the cost shock c, the power of incentives b, and the level
of debt D. By choosing D, the rm can inuence the regulatory price, but
the extent to which it can do so is determined by the power of incentives,
b. In this setting, we can prove the following result (for derivations see
Appendix C.1):
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold level of incentives b such that D =
D2 if b  b and D = D1 if b > b.
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That is, if incentives are su¢ ciently powerful, the rm chooses the lower
level of debt D1. Weaker incentive structures lead the rm to choose the
higher level of debt D2. Intuitively, the rm wants to issue debt to extract
higher regulated prices. However, these higher prices only compensate the
increased probability of bankruptcy if the share 1  b of cost reimbursed is
large enough, leading the rm to choose a level of debt equal to the higher
end of the range. The power of incentives here is a simple measure of the
responsiveness of the price channel to nancial distress. When 1   b is
small (as in a high-powered regulation scheme), this responsiveness is low
and the equilibrium level of debt chosen is instead equal to the lower end of
the range. As such, Proposition 1 tells us that higher powered regulation
is likely to translate into a lower level of leverage.
When we allow RD to deviate from RE we can show the following (see
proof in Appendix C.1):
Proposition 2 An increase in RD lowers the threshold level of incentives
b.
Intuitively, as the price of debt increases, the share 1   b of the rms
cost reimbursed must be su¢ ciently high to ensure that higher prices still
compensate for the increased probability of bankruptcy. That is, only rms
operating under su¢ ciently low-powered regulation continue to nd high
levels of debt protable as debt becomes more expensive.69 Empirically, we
therefore expect that as the cost of debt increases, reductions in debt will
be larger amongst rms operating under high-powered regulation.
The model therefore predicts that leverage will be lower under higher-
powered regulation as the ability to use debt to achieve higher regulated
prices is more limited. Additionally, we expect that rms subject to higher-
powered regulation will be more likely to reduce leverage when the cost of debt
69Technically as RD increases, the threshold b falls, implying that among rms with
high leverage, the fraction facing the highest-powered incentive will reduce their leverage.
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increases. We use this result Proposition 2 to motivate our empirical
strategy in Section 3.5.
3.2.2 Discussion
Comparison to Spiegel & Spulber (1994)
Our model is in the spirit of Spiegel and Spulber (1994). In particular,
the rm maximises prot by choosing levels of debt (D) and equity (E) to
satisfy an investment constraint K = E +D, with prices ultimately deter-
mined by a regulator that is averse to bankruptcy. The model diverges in
two principal ways from Spiegel and Spulber. Firstly, in our model the rm
takes the required level of investment (K) as given, whereas in Spiegel and
Spulber, K is a chosen by the rm. This reects the di¤erent institutional
environments being considered: we analyse infrastructure concessions in
which the required investment level is stated ex ante by contract, whereas
Spiegel and Spulber analyse US utility monopolies in which investment is
ongoing and, to some extent at least, is undertaken to stimulate demand.
Secondly, and more fundamentally, the regulator in our model sets a
simple pre-announced pricing rule. In Spiegel and Spulber, the regulator
sets prices after the rms capital structure choices, and does so in order to
maximise a weighted sum of consumer surplus and rm prots. The rm
must therefore act strategically, taking into account the expected actions of
the regulator. Again, this divergence reects the institutional environment.
In the US framework of Spiegel and Spulber, there is a legal basis through
which the regulator can explicitly balance consumersand the rms inter-
ests when setting tari¤s (see Spiegel and Spulber 1994 p.426). In our Latin
American context, the pricing structure is specied ex ante in the project
contract, albeit with provisions that allow the regulator to periodically re-
vise tari¤s in the event of cost or demand shocks. It is the frequency of these
revisions that determine how responsive the regulated price is to changes
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in costs, such as an increase in the threat of bankruptcy. It is therefore the
frequency of these tari¤ revisions that we use to determine whether regula-
tion is classied as high- or low-powered (see Section 3.4).
The regulatory response to debt
Price is modelled as a function of expected costs, where expected costs
include expected bankruptcy costs given by '(p;D)T . That is, regulated
prices increase as the probability of bankruptcy increases; under high-
powered regulation this price response is weaker. Why is it reasonable
to think that regulated prices respond to expected bankruptcy costs?
Firstly, there is historical precedent. Ehrhardt and Irwin (2004) provide
a number of case studies in which regulators have reacted to the threat of
bankruptcy with higher prices or increased subsidies. Such cases include the
Melbourne tram and train franchises and the initial toll road concessions
in Mexico. They argue that "probably the main reason why governments
do not like to see private infrastructure providers go bankrupt is the threat
of service disruption" (p.47). Such service disruption could occur either in
the transfer of project management to the receivers, or in the more extreme
case of liquidation.70
As noted by Ehrhardt and Irwin (2004), severe service disruption is in
fact generally avoidable. The host government itself often has the power to
appoint a receiver to run the company in the event of bankruptcy. Further,
liquidation is generally unappealing because infrastructure investments have
huge sunk costs; the assets themselves have little value elsewhere. In prac-
tice however, governments have generally been reluctant to assume own-
ership of infrastructure projects; either because they lack the capacity to
do so or they fear the legal repercussions of intervention (see Ehrhardt and
70Once the company has defaulted on its debt, the debtholder typically has the right
to assume management of the company, running the company through a receiver until
such debts are repaid. It could instead liquidate the company, selling o¤ the assets and
shutting the company down.
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Irwin 2004, p.48). They also (incorrectly) tend to associate bankruptcy
with liquidation. Such capacity and institutional constraints are likely to
be more acute in a developing country context.
A further motivation for avoiding bankruptcy is that it sends negative
signals to potential investors regarding the level of risk (Ehrhardt and Irwin
2004). Such signals are amplied by media interest and scrutiny, which is
often critical of the government. As argued by Guasch (2004), "accepting
concession failures brings political costs" (p.38). We believe it is reasonable
therefore to claim that regulators increase prices when the probability of
bankruptcy increases, as they have done in the past. It does so to protect
its own interests, not because it cares more about the returns of debt hold-
ers than of equity holders.
Regulatory commitment
The model in section 3.2.1 assumes that the regulator is committed to
the ex ante price setting rule. In practice however, regulatory commitment
might be di¢ cult to sustain (see e.g. Moszoro 2013). Importantly, the rm
may be able to force a price revision whenever the probability of bankruptcy
is high. It is easy to see that the possibility of such a revision pushes the
regulation towards a lower-powered scheme. The probability that it then
exceeds the threshold b increases, making it more likely that leverage is
high.
Imperfect commitment presents an empirical challenge. If seemingly
high-powered contracts are renegotiated whenever the rm faces nancial
di¢ culty, then the importance of the ex ante regulation is undermined. To
deal with this problem, we therefore examine the determinants of contract
renegotiations in section 3.4. We nd no evidence that renegotiations are
caused by the likelihood of nancial distress. This is reassuring as it sug-
gests that the responsiveness of the price channel to nancial distress is
indeed weaker under high-powered regulation.
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Other channels
Although the model focuses on the channel from regulated prices to lever-
age, there are other possible mechanisms through which the design of reg-
ulation could a¤ect capital structure. Firstly, by transferring greater risk
to the rm, high-powered regulation may directly increase the probability
of bankruptcy. Under the static trade-o¤ theory of capital structure, this
would reduce leverage (all else equal). Our model partially captures this
e¤ect, as the probability of bankruptcy increases in b; it does not drive our
results as @'

@D
is independent of b (see Appendix). Our empirical ndings
cast doubt on the importance of this mechanism however: revenue volatil-
ity is a positive (generally insignicant) determinant of leverage and less
protable rms have higher leverage.
An alternative possibility is that high-powered regulation increases the
cost of equity, leading such rms to choose higher leverage. In the Capi-
tal Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the cost of equity is determined by the
covariance of the companys returns with the market portfolio. Alexan-
der et al. (1996) nd that this covariance is higher in price cap contracts
than rate-of-return contracts in regulated infrastructure projects, implying
a higher cost of equity. Unlike the previous mechanism, this o¤sets the pre-
dictions of the model. The magnitude of this e¤ect in our sample may not
be signicant however as almost all contracts include annual tari¤ adjust-
ments for ination, and many allow adjustments for exchange rate shocks.
Such clauses reduce the extent to which the projects returns are dictated
by economy-wide cost shocks. Furthermore, Gaggero (2007) replicates the
methodology of Alexander et al. (1996) and does not nd that the cost of
equity is higher under higher-powered regulation.
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 Regulation and nancial data
We construct an original dataset of 124 transport concessions in Brazil,
Chile, Colombia and Peru over the period 1992-2011. The complete panel 
tracking all projects since the year of contract signing covers 1,360 obser-
vations and nancial data covers 1,037 observations. Details on the design
of price regulation come from project contracts, sector legislation and rene-
gotiation agreements. In addition we have information on the specics of
the projects (investment size, duration, etc.), on the institutional and reg-
ulatory environment, the timing and content of renegotiation agreements,
as well as the evolution of key economic variables. Table 3.1 provides sum-
mary statistics of the main variables. Table C1 in the Appendix provides a
full list of variables and sources.
Our principal measure of leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to to-
tal assets. The units of observation are project companies (as opposed
to project sponsors) which, as argued by Esty (2004), are strategic re-
search sitesand provide a new and, potentially, very powerful laboratory
to analyse structural decisions and to show why they matter. The fact
that project companies are created for a specic and well-dened purpose
is greatly benecial from a research perspective.71
Firm-level nancial data comes directly from regulatory agencies and
from commercial databases. OSITRAN, the Peruvian federal regulator,
provided the data for all Peruvian projects and the Agencia Nacional de
Infraestructura (ANI) provided data for Colombian road projects. The two
commercial databases we use are the ISI Emerging Markets Database of
Euromoney Institutional Investor and the Orbis Database of Bureau van
71Project companies are created by the "project sponsors" for a specic project.
Project sponsors are typically large listed companies with many subsidiaries. The -
nancial accounts of the sponsors therefore tell us little about how leverage responds to
regulatory conditions in a specic project.
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Dijk.
In Chile, Colombia and Peru all concessions are regulated at the federal
level. In Colombia the federal regulator varies across subsectors and across
time, whereas in Chile all projects are regulated by the Ministerio de Obras
Publicas (MOP) and all Peruvian projects are regulated by OSITRAN. In
Brazil concessions are regulated at both the federal and state level. In
addition to federal road and rail projects we have data on state-level road
projects from Parana and Rio Grande do Sul and rail projects from Rio de
Janeiro.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
All Brazil Chile Colombia Peru
Price
cap=1
Price
cap=0
Observations (Full) 1360 452 441 311 156 1174 186
Observations
(Financial)
1037 351 398 147 141 917 120
Projects 124 37 40 23 24 107 17
Leverage 0.69 0.81 0.66 0.52 0.62 0.69 0.62
LT Leverage 0.44 0.43 0.54 0.26 0.31 0.45 0.34
Net Leverage 0.64 0.76 0.63 0.49 0.51 0.65 0.57
Price cap (% obs) 0.86 0.71 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.00
MIG (% obs) 0.48 0.00 0.80 0.64 0.67 0.56 0.00
Flexible contract (%
obs)
0.11 0.00 0.24 0.16 0.00 0.13 0.00
Investment Size
($m, 2000)
268.84 459.56 211.81 140.27
133.7
9
244.97 419.51
Contract Duration
(yrs)
22.57 23.23 22.19 20.38 26.10 22.59 22.44
Return on Assets 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.17
Volatility 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
GDP Growth 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03
Inflation 0.11 0.19 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.36
Stock Market Value 12.84 22.23 13.45 2.80 3.39 12.17 17.10
Pr. Bond Market
Capitalization
11.10 13.67 18.46 0.43 3.78 11.28 9.96
Renegotiations per
Project
3.22 1.46 2.73 7.57 2.58 3.57 1.00
Renegotiations per
Project-Year
0.29 0.12 0.25 0.56 0.40 0.33 0.09
Mean values reported. MIG stands for Minimum Income Guarantee, Return on Assets is calculated as EBIT/total assets,
and Volatility is the standard deviation of ROA by project.
3.3.2 Renegotiations
A renegotiation is considered to have occurred if a concession contract
underwent a signicant change or amendment not envisioned or driven by
stated contingencies(Guasch 2004, p.80). There are a total of 399 renego-
tiations across the sample, with an average of 3.22 per project. The most
signicant renegotiations occurred in the Brazilian states of Parana and
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Rio Grande do Sul. In Parana the state government signicantly reduced
tari¤s in 1998, less than a year after the projects had become operational.
This was followed by further renegotiations in 2000 and 2002, which revised
tari¤s and investment obligations in an attempt to restore the economic-
nancial equilibrium of the contracts. A similar situation occurred in Rio
Grande do Sul, where the state government blocked contractual tari¤ ad-
justments and attempted to cut tari¤s within a year of the contracts being
signed. Again this was followed by multiple renegotiations compensating
the rm and attempting to restore economic-nancial equilibrium.
Another major set of renegotiations occurred in Chile in 2003/04 with
the introduction of the Income Distribution Mechanism (IDM). The IDM
guaranteed that rms would receive toll revenues equivalent to annual tra¢ c
growth of x% throughout the project (where x = 4, 4.5 or 5% and was chosen
by the rm). If the guaranteed revenue was not met, the concession could
be extended by up to 10 years, and ultimately the government would be
liable for any remaining di¤erence. In exchange for the guarantee, rms
were required to carry out additional investments (see Engel et al. 2006
and Vassallo 2006 for further details).
The reasons for renegotiation are shown in Figure 3.2. Almost half are
to alter the projects investment plan or schedule, such as the IDM rene-
gotiations in Chile. These renegotiations are typically instigated by the
regulator. The rm may seek a renegotiation to compensate for exoge-
nous changes in demand or costs, or due to previous government action
(in the public interest). Such public interest renegotiations include
the reduction of tari¤s in Parana and Rio Grande do Sul, plus a number of
renegotiations in Colombia which lowered road tolls for local residents. The
Othercategory consists largely of changes to deadlines of various kinds.
The category also includes changes to environmental legislation, changes in
the assets of the rm (in lease agreements) and disagreements over taxes
and other costs.
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Figure 3.2: Reasons for renegotiation
Figure 3.3 shows the outcomes of renegotiations. Again, the most com-
mon outcome is a change to the investment plan or schedule. Typically,
the rm will agree to increase the volume of investment in exchange for a
direct payment from the regulator, an increase in tari¤s or an extension of
the contract. Indeed, this particular scenario accounts for 38 percent of all
renegotiations in the sample. Tari¤s themselves are a¤ected by just over 20
percent of renegotiations.
Figure 3.3: Outcomes of renegotiation
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3.4 Regulation and renegotiations
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, the de facto regulatory regime is a function of
both (i) the project contract, and (ii) the commitment of the regulator to
that contract. If the rm can force a renegotiation when the probability of
nancial distress is high, the regulatory regime becomes less high-powered.
Ultimately, the distinction between very high-powered contracts (e.g. price
cap) and much lower-powered contracts (e.g. rate of return) could be-
come meaningless. Given the high rate of renegotiation in Latin American
infrastructure projects, this is potentially a serious issue. Sirtaine et al.
(2005, p.37) argue that in Latin America:
The short interval between the granting of a concession and
its renegotiation, about two years, and the outcome of the rene-
gotiation process, makes the resulting regime a hybrid of price
caps and rate of return. . . Thus in practice both types of regu-
latory regime tend to converge to a hybrid.
For our purposes, the key distinction between high- and low-powered
regulation is the regulators responsiveness to the risk of nancial distress.
In this Section we therefore rst outline our classication of regulatory
regimes, and then investigate whether renegotiations fundamentally change
the incentive structure of the original contracts. In particular, we ask
whether high levels of debt or poor nancial performance are strong predic-
tors of renegotiation. We show that this is not the case. This means that
in our core empirical specication (Section 3.5), we can rely primarily on
the project contract for our measurement of regulatory design.
3.4.1 Ex ante regulation
To capture the (ex ante) incentive structure of the contract, we include a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the project is subject to price cap regulation.
We dene a contract as price cap if there is an automatic tari¤ revision at
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most every 5 years. Table C2 in the Appendix provides summary details
on the rules for revising and adjusting tari¤s across projects.
In the context of the sample, this simple classication appears reason-
able. In a large number of projects, there are no automatic tari¤ revisions
in the contract. Although some of these projects allow for discretionary
reviews, they are essentially pure xed price contracts. In Peru, a number
of projects are RPI-X with revisions every 5 years.72 As standard therefore,
we also classify RPI-X projects as price cap.
A drawback of the sample is that variation in the type of regulation is
relatively limited: 14 percent of observations are non-price cap, and this
consists of 14 federal road projects in Brazil and 3 port projects in Colom-
bia. The Brazilian projects have tari¤ reviews every year. The aim of the
regulation is to re-establish the ex ante (contracted) internal rate of re-
turn (IRR) of the project whenever an event occurs for which the regulator
bears the risk (see Veron and Cellier 2010 for details). In the Colombian
port projects, tari¤s are revised every 2 years. The rm submits a tari¤
proposal to the regulator, which the regulator can approve or reject. If
the proposal is rejected the regulator imposes a "competitive tari¤" which
ensures an "acceptable" rate of return for the rm.
Although some contract clauses are tailored to individual projects, the
design of regulation itself appears to have broader determinants. Guasch
et al. (2007) for example consider the determinants of regulatory design in
Latin American water and transport concessions. They nd that "the choice
of regulation appears to hinge mostly on the quality of institutions. Price
cap regulation is less likely when the bureaucracy is more e¢ cient, captur-
ing perhaps the enhanced ability of bureaucrats to manage informationally
demanding schemes like rate of return regulation" (p.26). This explanation
is broadly consistent with the variation in our sample, as the non-price cap
72RPI-X regulation consists of periodic price reviews (typically every 5 years) in which
a tari¤ is set that increases at the rate of ination (RPI) minus a factor X to account
for productivity gains.
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projects are all regulated at the national level. In Brazil for example the
national road concessions are non-price cap, whereas the federally regulated
projects are all price cap. Guasch (2004) and Holt (2007) also argue that
there are "trends" in the design of regulation, particularly the increased
use of price cap following its development in the UK. We therefore do not
believe that the non-price cap projects have been allocated such regulation
for very specic project-related reasons. Our results are not dependent on
regulation being randomly assigned however; indeed we analyse how lever-
age changes over time within projects to deal with the possible endogeneity
of regulation.
3.4.2 Determinants of renegotiation
Having established an ex ante classication of regulatory regimes, we now
ask whether renegotiations fundamentally alter this classication. In par-
ticular, we are interested in whether renegotiations are a response to poor
nancial performance. If the rm can renegotiate when there is a risk of
nancial distress, then the incentive to use leverage to gain higher prices
may be just as strong under high-powered regimes as low-powered regimes.
To test this, we create a renegotiation dummy Rijnt equal to 1 if conces-
sion contract i in sector j in country n at time t is renegotiated. We regress
this on three alternative measures of poor nancial performance or distress.
The rst is the leverage ratio, the second is a "distress" dummy equal to
one if the rm has a working capital ratio less than 0.5, and the third is
a "poor performance" dummy equal to 1 if the rm has return on assets
(ROA) more than 1 standard deviation below the mean for its country.73
73The working capital ratio is dened as current assets divided by current liabilities.
A ratio below 1 is typically used as an indicator of liquidity problems. Given the highly
leveraged nature of project nance transactions however, a ratio below 1 is extremely
common. We therefore choose a more extreme ratio of 0.5. Even at this level, over a
third of observations classify as being in distress.
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We run the following linear probability model:
Rijnt = 1finit +X
0
ijnt2 + i + t + eijnt (24)
where Rijnt is the renegotiation dummy, finit is the measure of nancial
performance for rm i in year t and Xijnt is the vector of controls used by
Guasch et al. (2007) in their study of renegotiations in Latin America.
Specically, Xijnt consists of project age, a price cap dummy, a measure of
bureaucratic quality, a lagged election dummy, and lagged GDP growth. To
estimate the e¤ect of these variables on renegotiation, for comparison with
the Guasch et al. study, we rst run the model with country and sector
xed e¤ects. We then re-estimate the model using project xed e¤ects i.74
The results are presented in Table 3.2. Whether we use country and sec-
tor xed e¤ects, columns (1) to (3), or project xed e¤ects, columns (4) to
(6), none of the nancial performance variables are signicant. Firms with
higher leverage and weaker protability are no more likely to experience
renegotiations than others. Of the Guasch et al. control variables, there is
some evidence that price cap contracts are more likely to be renegotiated.
This is largely driven however by the Brazilian federal road projects, which
are non-price cap and include provisions in the contract for regular invest-
ment adjustments (see also Veron and Cellier 2010). In such projects the
investment programme changes frequently, but it is not considered a rene-
gotiation (bringing down the rate of renegotiation amongst non-price cap
projects). As in Guasch et al. (2007), bureaucratic quality reduces renego-
tiation, and older projects appear less likely to be renegotiated (the project
age variable being highly signicant when year xed e¤ects are excluded).
In Appendix C.3 we replicate the Guasch et al. methodology by esti-
mating equation (24) by random e¤ect probit (Table C3).
74Most of the Guasch et al controls are removed by the project xed e¤ects. Those
that remain are insignicant and do not a¤ect the results of interest.
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Table 3.2: Determinants of renegotiation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leverage 0.056 0.063
(0.075) (0.046)
Distress -0.003 0.033
(0.010) (0.036)
Performance 0.041 0.111
(0.049) (0.081)
Guasch et al (2007) controls
Project age -0.007 -0.008 -0.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Price cap 0.114 0.143** 0.124*
(0.057) (0.030) (0.051)
Bureaucratic quality -0.224** -0.244*** -0.233**(0.041) (0.027) (0.042)
Election (-1) -0.041 -0.048 -0.019
(0.020) (0.025) (0.023)
GDP growth (-1) 0.021 0.016* 0.024
(0.010) (0.007) (0.012)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Sector &country
Sector &
country
Sector &
country Project Project Project
Observations 981 946 878 983 948 879
R-squared (within) 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.06 0.07 0.08
Robust standard errors (clustered by country in columns 1-3 and by project in columns 4-6) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Such results are only indicative. They do not imply that rms cannot
renegotiate when in nancial di¢ culty; only that being in di¢ culty does not
increase the likelihood of renegotiation. To address this, we can look in more
detail at those rms that have particularly high leverage, or particularly
poor protability, and analyse the renegotiations that occur. That is, we
can explicitly check the renegotiation agreements for evidence that rms in
di¢ culty achieve favourable renegotiations.
We found little evidence that this is the case. Take the Distress vari-
able used in Table 3.2 for example. This is a dummy equal to 1 if the
rm has a working capital ratio less than 0.5. There are 342 project-year
observations in which this variable equals 1, and 70 of these observations
involve a contract renegotiation. Based on the renegotiation agreements
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however, we classify only 14 of these as being to nancially compensate the
rm (as in Figure 3.1). In each of these cases, compensation mechanisms
were agreed only because of previous breach of contract by the regulator,
which disadvantaged the rm. The vast majority of the renegotiations oc-
curred to change the investment works and schedule. Whilst this could in
principal be a way to nancially assist the rms, analysing the text of the
renegotiation agreements suggest that this is not the case.75
Across our sample therefore, it does not seem that contracts are sys-
tematically renegotiated when rms face nancial di¢ culty. This reduces
the concern that the di¤erent regulatory regimes converge to a hybrid,
and suggests that regulators perhaps do a better job than often recognised
in enforcing price caps. For our purposes, it suggests that the transmission
from debt to prices is indeed weaker under high-powered contracts. For
our empirical methodology we can therefore concentrate on the regulatory
design as specied in the project contracts.
3.5 Methodology
We return now to our primary question: what is the e¤ect of regulatory
design on the leverage of the project companies? Building on the previous
Section, we use our price cap dummy to capture the power of the regulation.
Our initial specication is given by:
lijnt = 1pci + F
0
it2 +M
0
nt3 + j + n + t + int (25)
where lijnt is the leverage of rm i in sector j in country n at time t;
pci is the price cap dummy; Fit is a vector of nancial controls for rm i
at time t; Mnt is a vector of macroeconomic controls for country n at time
t; and j, n and t are sector, country and year xed e¤ects respectively.
75Many of the changes to investment and works appear quite "benign", such as am-
mending works to improve tra¢ c safety and modifying investment plans under commu-
nity pressure.
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We also show that the results are not a¤ected by replacing the sector and
country xed e¤ects with sector-country xed e¤ects jn.
The control variables Fit and Mnt are standard in the capital structure
literature. The rm-level nancial variables Fit consist of ROA, volatility,
log of assets and the ratio of xed to total assets (as a measure of "tangible"
assets).76 When ROA is higher, the probability of nancial distress is lower,
which should increase the availability of debt (Rajan and Zingales 1995,
Frank and Goyal 2009). If the "World Bank view" is correct, that rms
prefer as much debt as creditors will allow, we expect this variable to be
positively correlated with leverage.77 For much the same reasons volatility,
dened as the standard deviation of ROA, is expected to be negatively
correlated with leverage. Larger rms, captured by assets, may be less
susceptible to revenue swings and so have a greater appetite for debt, as
the probability of distress is lower. Finally tangible assets retain value in
the event of bankruptcy, increasing the rms ability to borrow (Rajan and
Zingales 1995).
The macro variables Mnt are particularly relevant to an emerging mar-
ket context, in which rms face supply-side constraints. We expect GDP
growth to boost leverage if rms are able to borrow against future growth
prospects (Booth et al. 2001). Similarly the bond market capitalization to
GDP ratio increases the supply of debt, whilst the stock market value to
GDP ratio increases the supply of equity. As in Booth et al. (2001) and De
Jong et al. (2008) we expect larger bond markets to increase leverage, and
larger stock markets to reduce leverage.
The principal concern with equation (25) is that regulation is not ran-
domly assigned. As an example, it is reasonable to suppose that rms
bidding for price cap contracts are less risk-averse than those bidding for
rate-of-return contracts. Being less risk-averse, these rms may also prefer
76Volatility is the standard deviation of ROA by project.
77The "World Bank view" is a variant of the static trade-o¤ theory. The traditional
rival view is the pecking order hypothesis, which predicts that ROA will be negatively
correlated with leverage.
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debt nancing. This selection problem will bias 1 upwards in equation
(25), o¤setting the true e¤ect of price cap regulation (if that is negative
as argued in Section 3.2). Similarly, price cap contracts may be systemati-
cally assigned to less risky projects. Again, this could generate a spurious
(positive) relationship between price cap regulation and leverage.
To deal with this selection issue, we introduce project xed e¤ects and
analyse the response of rms to changes in the cost of debt. The xed
e¤ects control for selection issues by analysing changes within projects once
contracts have already been assigned. We use the countrys lending interest
rate as our cost of debt measure as this is plausibly exogenous to the rms
actions. The lending rate is collected by the IMF as a representative interest
rate o¤ered by banks to resident customers. It is considered to be the
rate that usually meets the short- and medium-term nancing needs of the
private sector. Although in practice the interest rate charged to each rm
will include a rm-specic default risk, this risk will be partly determined
by the rms leverage ratio. By using country-level interest rates, we are
able to focus only on those shocks that are exogenous to the rm.
The model presented in Section 3.2 predicts a greater reduction in lever-
age amongst rms subject to price cap regulation when there is an increase
in the cost of debt. We therefore expect the interaction between price cap
and the interest rate to be negative in the following regression:
lijnt = #1rnt + #2pci  rnt + F 0it#3 +M 0it#4 + i + t + ijnt (26)
where rnt is the lending interest rate in country n in year t; Fit and
Mnt are the nancial and macro controls as above; i and t are project
and year xed e¤ects respectively; and ijnt is the error term. We being
by running equation (26) using the leverage ratio as the dependent variable
lijnt. When the interest rate rnt changes however, this will change the
rms future earnings expectations, which in turn will a¤ect their leverage
decision. It is likely that rms expect lower growth in subsequent periods
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when the interest rate increases. If this is the case, then the rms demand
for equity will also change (Frank & Goyal 2009). As well as using the
leverage ratio as our dependent variable in equation (26), we therefore also
estimate this model using the log of liabilities as the dependent variable.
This provides a potentially cleaner way to test the relative e¤ect of the cost
of debt on price cap and non-price cap rms.78
3.6 Results
Table 3.3 presents the baseline results from equation (25). Columns (1)
and (2) include sector and country xed e¤ects, and columns (3) to (4)
include sector-country xed e¤ects. Although the latter approach better
controls for omitted variables, it substantially reduces the available variation
in regulation. Columns (2) and (4) exclude extreme outliers, dened as an
observation where the leverage ratio is 3 standard deviations above the
relevant country mean. It is common to exclude such observations in all
specications (e.g. Booth et al. 2001), but here we prefer to present results
for both the full and smaller sample.
The rst row shows that the price cap dummy is insignicant in all
specications, which may reect some of the selection concerns discussed
above. Of the remaining variables, the negative coe¢ cients on ROA and
the countrys stock market value are particularly notable. These results
are at odds with the view of many infrastructure practitioners that rms
have a strong preference for debt over equity (World Bank Institute 2012).
Instead we nd that when protability is higher, and so debt availability
should be greater, rms reduce their leverage.79 The negative impact of
protability on leverage is now well established in the empirical literature
78In this case, we drop the natural logarithm of real assets as this consists of liabilities
plus equity. We would still expect the size of the rm to have a signicant impact on
total liabilities however, and so we replace the variable with the natural logarithm of real
revenues.
79We note however that the positive coe¢ cients on size and GDP growth lend some
support to the "World Bank view".
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(Frank & Goyal 2009) and lends support to the pecking order theory of
capital structure (Myers 1984). Likewise, as stock markets develop, and so
equity availability is greater, rms reduce leverage. If the trade-o¤ theory
were correct, we would not expect such a signicant (negative) role for stock
market development. Our results suggest that supply-side constraints are
actually stronger with regards to equity than debt.80
Table 3.3: Baseline estimations - Regulation and leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price cap 0.033 0.019 0.040 0.068
(0.059) (0.054) (0.077) (0.060)
Firm-financial controls (F)
ROA -0.351* -0.197** -0.370* -0.203**
(0.202) (0.079) (0.206) (0.081)
Volatility 0.296 0.091 0.438* 0.124
(0.223) (0.166) (0.256) (0.157)
Size 0.019 0.054*** 0.016 0.057***
(0.024) (0.017) (0.027) (0.017)
Tangible -0.089 0.009 -0.104 -0.004
(0.085) (0.077) (0.085) (0.078)
Macro controls (M)
GDP growth 0.015* 0.014*** 0.015** 0.014***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
Bond market -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 -0.003
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Stock market -0.005* -0.006** -0.006* -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Sector &country
Sector &
country
Sector-
country
Sector-
country
Observations 815 803 815 803
Projects 111 111 111 111
R-squared (within) 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.23
R-squared (between) 0.38 0.27 0.40 0.34
The dependent variable is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (book values). Robust standard errors (clustered by
firm) in parentheses. Columns (2) and (4) exclude extreme outliers.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
80If the price cap variable is endogenous as argued, then in general all the coe¢ cients
will be inconsistent. The coe¢ cients on the control variables are almost unchanged when
we re-estimate the regression without the price cap variable however.
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Table 3.4 presents the results from the xed-e¤ects regression (26). Col-
umn (1) uses leverage as the dependent variable, and columns (2) to (4) use
log liabilities as the dependent variable. Column (3) lags the interest rate
one period, and column (4) additionally drops outliers as above.81
In all columns the interaction between the interest rate and price cap
dummy is negative and signicant. When the cost of borrowing increases,
price cap rms reduce leverage more than others. This interpretation is
strengthened when we use log liabilities as the dependent variable, as the
interest rate itself also enters negatively. (As argued above, the inclusion of
equity in the calculation of leverage makes it di¢ cult to predict the e¤ect
of interest rate changes on leverage.) These results support the predictions
of the model, and suggest that rms operating under price cap have a lower
demand for debt than those operating under less high-powered regulation.
The control variables enter similarly to Table 3.3. Again, it is notable
that the ROA is negative in all specications, and highly signicant when
log liabilities are the dependent variable. The country stock market value
is again negative and highly signicant, whereas bond capitalization is in-
signicant throughout. As we might expect in an emerging market sample,
these results suggest that rms face supply-side barriers to achieving their
desired capital structure. Again it is notable that such barriers appear
particularly strong for accessing equity.
81The results are generally stronger when using log(liabilities) as the dependent vari-
able. If we replicate columns (3) and (4) using leverage as the dependent variable the
interaction term is not signicant. The results are omitted in the Table for brevity.
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Table 3.4: Fixed e¤ects estimations Cost of debt and leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
leverage ln (liab.) ln (liab.) ln (liab.)
Interest 0.002 -0.004 -0.016** -0.018**
(0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Interest * Price cap -0.005* -0.015** -0.016** -0.015*
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Firm-financial controls (F)
ROA -0.267 -1.472*** -1.527*** -1.750***
(0.218) (0.442) (0.441) (0.511)
Size 0.001 0.307*** 0.306*** 0.312***
(0.047) (0.105) (0.104) (0.104)
Tangible 0.022 1.372*** 1.312*** 1.312***
(0.109) (0.401) (0.384) (0.386)
Macro controls (M)
GDP growth 0.017** 0.041* 0.037 0.036
(0.008) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Bond market -0.007 0.018 0.019 0.016
(0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Stock market -0.007** -0.022** -0.034*** -0.033***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 815 772 772 760
Projects 111 108 108 108
R-squared (within) 0.09 0.35 0.36 0.38
Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in parentheses. The dependent variable in column (1) is the ratio of total
liabilities to total assets (book values). In columns (2) to (4) the dependent variable is ln(liabilities). Column (3) replaces
the interest rate with its lag, and column (4) replicates column (3) but excluding extreme outliers. In column (1) “size”is
the log of total assets, which is replaced by the log of revenues in columns (2) to (4)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.7 Conclusion
PPPs and concession contracts have become a popular mechanism for deliv-
ering major infrastructure projects. The understanding of how such projects
are nanced, and why, is still relatively limited however. It has been argued
that private investors use leverage to secure higher prices, which is feasi-
ble when prices increase with expected costs, including possible bankruptcy
costs. In practice, prices may respond to such costs if the regulator wants
to avoid bankruptcy. Ehrhardt and Irwin (2004, p.47) argue that "probably
the main reason why governments do not like to see private infrastructure
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providers go bankrupt is the fear of service disruption". We present a sim-
ple model that captures this idea. The model shows that when regulation is
high-powered, such as under a xed price or "price cap" regime, this price
incentive for leverage is weakened. We therefore expect rms operating
under price cap contracts to have less demand for debt, all else equal.
To test this we construct a unique database of 124 transport concessions
in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. We source data on nancial structure,
the design of regulation (from contracts and sector legislation) and contract
renegotiations. Following the model, we nd that price cap rms reduce
debt faster than others when the cost of debt increases. We conclude that,
all else equal, high-powered regulation reduces leverage.
Our paper makes two further contributions. Firstly, we contribute to
the scarce evidence base on the nancing of infrastructure projects in de-
veloping and emerging markets. By sourcing nancial statements directly
from regulatory agencies we are able to create a panel of over 1,000 obser-
vations and analyse within-project variation. In doing so, we question some
of the prevailing logic including the view that infrastructure investors have
a strong preference for debt over equity (World Bank Institute 2012). If
this were true, we would expect leverage to increase in protability as it is
easier for rms to meet lendersrequirements (Yescombe 2007). Instead,
we nd that leverage falls in protability. This in fact suggests that the
pecking order hypothesis may be more relevant to infrastructure rms than
the commonly held trade-o¤ theory. We also nd that leverage falls as stock
markets become more developed.
Secondly, we contribute to the literature on incomplete contracting and
renegotiation. The high frequency of renegotiation in Latin American con-
cessions has been identied elsewhere (e.g. Guasch 2004, Guasch et al.
2007) although the role of nancial performance in triggering renegotiations
has not been explored. We provide what is perhaps encouraging evidence:
nancial performance does not appear to be a signicant predictor of rene-
gotiation. This reduces the concern that regulation varies on paper but not
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in practice. That is, price cap contracts appear to still be high-powered
despite pervasive renegotiations.
Our results provide useful insights for regulators concerned about capital
structure and prudent nancial management. Given that PPPs represent
sizeable investments, particularly for developing countries, even small im-
provements in nancial management can lead to substantial cost savings.
It is therefore important to understand the motivations underlying rms
nancial decisions and how they respond to changes in the policy environ-
ment. This paper provides new evidence in that direction.
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5 Appendices
A Chapter 1
A.1 Maps
Figure A1 shows the Admin Level 1 regions used in the empirical work.
Boundaries are taken from Natural Earth, available as a .shp le at
http://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/
Figure A1: Admin 1 regional boundaries
Figure A2 presents light output for Rwanda and Zimbabwe for 1992 and
2012. As evident in the gures, Rwanda witnessed rapid growth over the
period, with real GDP growing by an average of 4.7% per year.82 Zimbabwe
su¤ered an overall decline in output over the period, with an average growth
rate of -0.5% per year. The contrast in lights growth compared to Rwanda
82Calculated using a compound growth rate on World Bank World Development Indi-
cators gures in constant $2005. Growth of GDP per capita was somewhat slower over
the period at 1.8% per year. In Zimbabwe, GDP per capita declined by an average of
1.6% per year.
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is clear from the Figure (it is also notable from the lights output that
Zimbabwe started from a much higher base, with GDP per capita more
than twice as high as Rwandas in 1992).
Figure A2: Lights growth, Rwanda and Zimbabwe
Rwanda
Zimbabwe
1992 2012
1992 2012
A.2 Robustness checks
The robustness checks re-estimate the main regression of interest - equation
(14), Table 1.4 - but modify the sample in the following ways: column (1)
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removes the 10 km bu¤ers around country borders; column (2) includes
domestic conict years; column (3) includes domestic regions in the calcu-
lation of [IMA; column (4) includes North African regions in the calculation
of [IMA; column (5) recalculates [IMA using the gravity estimates of Head
and Mayer (2015); column (6) restricts the sample to regions that have a
positive light reading in every year; column (7) drops all observations from
1992; and column (8) drops countries with a population below 5 million in
2000. All columns include a region-specic time trend.
Table A3: Robustness checks
Regional output and market access (1992-2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: OLS (CYFE)
ln ([IMA2) 0.658** 0.746*** 0.656** 0.662** 0.965** 0.641*** 0.696*** 0.462*
(0.272) (0.206) (0.272) (0.273) (0.419) (0.225) (0.255) (0.251)
Obs. 8,956 9,565 8,956 8,956 8,956 7,046 8,623 7,081
Regions 508 508 508 508 508 360 508 401
R-Squared 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.82 0.74 0.76
Panel B: PPML (CYFE)
ln ([IMA3) 0.903** 0.946*** 0.897** 0.891** 0.833*** 0.923** 0.624*
(0.392) (0.278) (0.392) (0.391) (0.312) (0.365) (0.366)
Obs. 8,956 9,565 8,956 8,956 7,046 8,623 7,080
Regions 508 508 508 508 360 508 401
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.82 0.74 0.76
Robust standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
127
B Chapter 2
B.1 Transit Routes & Disruptions
This Appendix provides details on the transit routes used by each land-
locked country, together with evidence of disruptions caused by conicts.
As in other studies, e.g. Arvis et al. (2011), it is helpful to classify the
continent into Eastern, Southern, Central and Western regional blocks.
The Eastern landlocked countries are Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. The
Southern landlocked countries are: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Central landlocked countries are: Chad and
Central African Republic. The Western landlocked countries are: Burkina
Faso, Mali, and Niger.
Eastern
The Eastern countries of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda are con-
nected to Dar es Salaam on the Central Corridor and Mombasa on the
Northern Corridor (UNCTAD 1994, Hoyle and Charlier 1995, Faye et al.
2004, Arvis et al. 2011). The Northern Corridor passes through both
Uganda and Rwanda through to Burundi; Faye et al. (2004) describe the
route as the regions "umbilical cord".83 Reecting relative distances, Bu-
rundis tra¢ c is concentrated on Dar es Salaam, Ugandas on Mombasa,
and Rwanda makes heavy use of both corridors. Data collected from port
authorities for example shows that over 1998-2010, the average proportions
of tra¢ c on the Central Corridor for Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda were
84 percent, 32 percent and 3 percent respectively.84
83Within the Northern Corridor there are both road and rail options, although the
all-road route handles the vast majority of transit tra¢ c (UNCTAD 1994).
84That is, 84% of Burundis transit tra¢ c used the Central Corridor and 16% used
the Northern Corridor (analogously for the other countries). I am grateful to Olivier
Hartmann for providing this data.
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As the Northern Corridor passes through all three of the regions land-
locked countries, civil wars in Uganda and Rwanda are considered to be in-
stances of conict on a major transit route. As noted by Faye et al. (2004),
"Rwandas recent brutal civil war [...] rendered the countrys infrastructure
virtually impassable not only for Rwandan transit, but for Burundian tran-
sit as well" (p.57). UNCTAD (1994) similarly argue that "it is now a major
policy of all the [Eastern] landlocked countries to diversify their transport
routes and modes, both for economic reasons and to enhance transit secu-
rity in the light of the recurrent incidence of civil strife which renders some
of the traditional routes impassable" (p.7).
Southern
Botswanas transit is predominantly via South Africa (UNCTAD 1995).
It is connected via the North-South Road Corridor, beneting from high-
quality paved surfaces (UNCTAD 1995, Briceño-Garmendia and Pushak
2011). Following the North-South Corridor is Botswanas single railway
line, connecting to both the South African railway system (Spoornet) and
the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ). With exports heavily concen-
trated in diamonds, air transport also plays a signicant role (UNCTAD
1995, Faye et al. 2004). Botswana now benets from an additional transit
route along the Trans-Kalahari Corridor to Walvis Bay, Namibia (Arvis et
al. 2011), although this corridor was not completed until 1998.
Malawis traditional transit routes were to the ports of Nacala and
Beira (Mozambique) by rail. Indeed, prior to the Mozambican civil war,
Malawi relied almost exclusively on such routes (Kennedy 1988, World Bank
1988). As a result of the conict, the line to Nacala closed in July 1985 and
the line to Beira closed in December 1983 (World Bank 1988). Commercial
operations began on the Nacala route in 1993, and a road route to Beira
was opened in 1995 (World Bank 1995). The rail line to Beira is still out
of service.
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Kennedy (1988) shows that 95 percent of Malawian overseas transit was
diverted to South African routes. Avoiding Mozambique completely meant
a road journey to Lusaka, and use of Zambian routes to South Africa (i.e.
through Zimbabwe). This involved a total journey of around 3,500 km
(World Bank 1988). Alternatively, passage through the Mozambican region
of Tete to Zimbabwe was possible in armed convoys, although terrorist at-
tacks were frequent. This limited the total distance to 2,667 km. Until 1984,
access to Dar es Salaam was via road to Lusaka, meaning the total distance
was in excess of 3,000 km (World Bank 1988). A gravel road connected
Malawi with Mbeya (Tanzania) in 1984, with a connection to the TAZARA
railway reducing the distance to Dar es Salaam to 1,770 km. Numerous
problems with this route however, including poor road infrastructure and
limited freight competition, meant that it played a minor role during the
Mozambican conict (see Kennedy 1988 for details).
Kennedy (1988) estimates Malawis additional transport costs during
the Mozambican conict in the region of $100 million per year. Table B1
demonstrates the cost di¤erence between the traditional routes through
Mozambique and those through South Africa.
Table B1: Transport costs from Blantyre, MK per ton (1988)
via Durban via Beira or Nacala
Tobacco in container 310 90
Tea in container 270 85
Sugar in bags 225 60
Diesel 440 45
Petrol 520 75
Source: World Bank (1988)
Swaziland has direct road and rail connections to the port of Maputo
in Mozambique and Durban in South Africa. Prior to the Mozambican
conict, almost all of Swazilands exports went by rail to Maputo (World
Bank 1978). This connection remained open during the conict, although
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only during daylight hours. The World Bank (1989) noted that "the line
[to Maputo] is in poor condition and is frequently closed because of secu-
rity problems". An additional rail connection to Maputo via Komatipoort
(South Africa) was completed in 1986, avoiding some of the most danger-
ous areas (Kennedy 1988). This too was only operational during daylight
hours however, and subject to service disruptions. Hence, during the con-
ict substantial tra¢ c was diverted to South African ports (World Bank
1989).
At independence in 1964, Zambias coastal access was almost exclu-
sively via Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to the ports of Beira andMaputo inMozam-
bique (Mwase 1987, Gleave 1992). Coastal access was also available through
Congo and Angola (the latter on the Benguela Railway), although such
routes were little used due to agreements made with Rhodesia Railways
during the colonial period. The link to Dar es Salaam was unpaved and
carried little tra¢ c (Gleave 1992). The Rhodesian unilateral declaration of
independence in 1965 however, and subsequent oil embargo, dramatically
increased the signicance of the northern routes. In 1968 the TAZAMA oil
pipeline was completed, and in 1972 the TANZAMHighway was completed;
both connecting Ndola with Dar es Salaam. By the early 1970s, only 50
percent of Zambias exports and imports were via Zimbabwe (Mwase 1987).
In 1973, the border with Rhodesia was closed and Zambias traditional
transit routes were blocked. The closure was imposed by the Rhodesian
government in response to Zambian support for rebel groups during the civil
war (Mwase 1987). Loss of rail access to the south meant that Zambias
external transit was split between Angola, on the Benguela Railway, and
Tanzania on the TANZAM Highway. Guerrilla activity forced the closure
of the Benguela rail link in August 1975.85 In the same year, the TAZARA
rail link to Dar es Salaam was completed. Between 1975 and 1978 therefore,
the Dar es Salaam corridor was Zambias only major transit route to the
851975 marked the beginning of the Angolan civil war, dened as 1,000 or more deaths
per year.
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coast (Hoyle and Charlier 1995).
In October 1978 Zambia partially reopened the southern routes through
Zimbabwe, and such routes were opened completely following Zimbabwean
independence in 1980 (Mwase 1987). Zambias transit routes via Mozam-
bique were therefore completely blocked during the Zimbabwean civil war
(1973-1979).
Zimbabwes shortest transit routes are by rail to Beira and Maputo
in Mozambique. The line to Maputo closed in 1984 due to the Mozambi-
can conict (World Bank 1989), although the line to Beira remained open
throughout. The Beira line was guarded by Zimbabwean and Mozambi-
can troops, although incidents of terrorism and sabotage were common
(Kennedy 1988, World Bank 1989).86 The World Bank (1990) noted that
"full use of these lines [through Mozambique] has been severely handicapped
by armed bandit attacks and deterioration of facilities. As a consequence,
Zimbabwes trade has become heavily dependent upon the relatively long
and costly rail routes through RSA". The report estimated potential sav-
ings of $65 million for Zimbabwe in 1988, based on rerouting ows through
Mozambique from South Africa. A later World Bank study (1999) esti-
mated the combined transport costs for Mozambiques neighbours, as a
result of the civil war, to be in the region of $200 million per year.
Central
The two Central African countries Chad and Central African Re-
public rely overwhelmingly on transit routes through Cameroon, with
over eighty percent of overseas trade now using the port of Douala (Tera-
vaninthorn and Raballand 2006, UNCTAD 2007). Historically, the road/river/rail
route to Pointe Noire (Congo) provided an alternative route for both land-
locked countries. Specically, the route involves: road from Ndjamena
86Gleave (1992) argues that "a systematic campaign was waged by MNR [Mozambican
National Resistance] to cut all motor roads and railways as well as vital bridges linking
Zimbabwe to the ports of Beira and Maputo...So successful was MNR that Zimbabwe
deployed about 12,000 soldiers in Mozambique to defend the route to Beira" (p.252).
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(Chad) to Bangui (Central African Republic), Oubangui-Congo rivers to
Brazzaville along the Congo-Democratic Republic of Congo border, then
rail to Pointe Noire. The river route is slower but cheaper than that through
Cameroon, and was traditionally preferred for the transit of bulk, low-value
commodities (UNCTAD 1995, Bakhache et al. 2006).
The river route has dramatically declined in importance, with freight
volumes falling by 92 percent between 1985 and 2000 (UNCTAD 2007).
There is some disagreement in the literature as to the reasons for this
decline, with Bakhache et al. (2006) and Faye et al. (2004) both not-
ing the e¤ects of security problems and pirating along the route owing to
instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Likewise, Collier (2008)
argues that "[Central African Republics] lifeline should be the Oubangui
River...but, unfortunately, downstream from the Central African Republic
was an area nominally part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo - civil
war territory, and hence lawless. So the river could not be used and the
logs were sent by road" (p.55). Other authors however have noted a decline
in water levels along the river, which is only navigable for 8 months of the
year (UNCTAD 1995, Faye et al. 2004, UNCTAD 2007). The route is
considerably longer for Chad, including a 500 km road journey to Bangui,
and had lost all market share by the early 1990s (Teravaninthorn and Ra-
balland 2009).87 In the Central African Republic however, the route still
accounted for a considerable proportion of transit tra¢ c until the late 1990s
(Bakhache et al. 2006).
Western
Finally, the Western landlocked countries Burkina Faso, Mali and
Niger are a¤orded the most transit options, with 5 coastal countries to
the south, and Senegal serving Mali to the west. Two international rail
networks serve the landlocked countries; Sitarail, connecting Ouagadougou
87Chad also benets from an alternative road route to Lagos (UNCTAD 1995, Arvis
et al 2011).
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to Abidjan, and Transrail, connecting Bamako to Dakar. Both lines were
constructed during the French colonial period, and have recently been priva-
tized (Sitarail in 1995 and Transrail in 2003) (see Bullock 2009 for details).
As noted by Chowdhury and Erdenebileg (2006), the Western landlocked
countries have largely maintained their traditional routes through Fran-
cophone neighbours. Despite the port of Tema being closer to Ouagadougou
than Abidjan for example, Ghana has until recently captured only limited
transit ows from Burkina Faso (see UNCTAD 1995 for a discussion).
Prior to the recent conict in Cote dIvoire, the vast majority of overseas
exports from Burkina Faso and Mali went through Abidjan.88 In 2001, 78
percent of Burkina Fasos exports, and 87 percent of Malis, went through
Abidjan (AFD 2005, Port Authorities data). These ows collapsed in 2003
during the Ivorian crisis: just 1 percent of Burkinas exports, and 7 percent
of Malis, passed through Abidjan in that year. The Sitarail connection also
su¤ered from lengthy service suspensions, with tra¢ c collapsing by over 80
percent between 2001 and 2003. The World Bank (2006) state that rail
transit to Ouagadougou from the coast is both faster, and around 30-40
percent cheaper, than road transport. Even with the commencement of the
service however, UNCTAD (2007) found that it was still di¢ cult to insure
goods on the line many years after the initial outbreak of violence.
Nigers transit tra¢ c is concentrated on the rail/road corridor through
Benin and road corridors through Togo and Nigeria (UNCTAD 1995, Arvis
et al. 2011). The majority of Nigers transit is via Benin (AFD 2005),
largely due to proximity, bilateral political agreements and joint owner-
ship of the Organisation Commune Benin-Niger (OCBN) railway (UNC-
TAD 1995). Little use is made of Abidjan; both prior to, and after, the
Ivoirian crisis less than 1 percent of overseas transit passed through the
88UNCTAD (1995) notes that Malian cotton is produced in the sourthern region,
making Abidjan somewhat closer than Dakar. The latter port plays a more prominent
role for imports. Similarly, Burkina Fasos transit routes are more diversied for imports.
In 2001, 49% of imports came through Abidjan, compared to 78% of exports (Port
Authorities data).
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port (Port Authorities data).
B.2 Transport Costs: Alternative Forms
Table B2 presents results from a linear form of equation (17), i.e.
tit =  + 1Tit + 2distit + i + t + "it
with variables dened as before (distance is rescaled to thousands of km).
Table B2: Transport costs, linear form (1975-2005)
Panel A: No time trend
Correlates of War PRIO-GRID
(1)
t
(2)
fr.
(3)
ins.
(4)
t
(5)
fr.
(6)
ins.
T -0.017 -0.018 -0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.000
(0.020) (0.017) (0.003) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002)
dist 0.064*** 0.058*** 0.007*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.005***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
Obs. 342 359 342 342 359 342
Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
R-Sq. 0.38 0.35 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.25
Panel B: Linear time trend
Correlates of War PRIO-GRID
(1)
t
(2)
fr.
(3)
ins.
(4)
t
(5)
fr.
(6)
ins.
T -0.009 -0.010 0.000 -0.009 -0.011 -0.001
(0.017) (0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.011) (0.002)
dist 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.006*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.005***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001)
Obs. 342 359 342 342 359 342
Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
R-Sq. 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.54
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
The dependent variables are ad valorem transport costs (columns 1 and 4), ad valorem freight costs
(columns 2 and 5) and ad valorem insurance costs (columns 3 and 6). Constants are included but not
reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B3 presents results from a log-level form of equation (17), i.e.
ln(tit) =  + 1Tit + 2distit + i + t + "it
with variables dened as before (again distance is rescaled to thousands
of km).
Table B3: Transport costs, log-level form (1975-2005)
Panel A: No time trend
Correlates of War PRIO-GRID
(1)
ln(t)
(2)
ln(fr.)
(3)
ln(ins.)
(4)
ln(t)
(5)
ln(fr.)
(6)
ln(ins.)
T -0.066 -0.171 0.134 0.191 0.072 0.410
(0.191) (0.175) (0.292) (0.156) (0.137) (0.373)
dist 0.537*** 0.599*** 1.003*** 0.325*** 0.396*** 0.695***
(0.090) (0.079) (0.112) (0.054) (0.033) (0.109)
Obs. 342 359 342 342 359 342
Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
R-Sq. 0.27 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.16 0.35
Panel B: Linear time trend
Correlates of War PRIO-GRID
(1)
ln(t)
(2)
ln(fr.)
(3)
ln(ins.)
(4)
ln(t)
(5)
ln(fr.)
(6)
ln(ins.)
T -0.098 -0.222 0.140 0.015 -0.121 0.239
(0.155) (0.157) (0.245) (0.150) (0.136) (0.295)
dist 0.271*** 0.287*** 0.718*** 0.162** 0.198*** 0.457***
(0.076) (0.074) (0.109) (0.064) (0.050) (0.105)
Obs. 342 359 342 342 359 342
Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
R-Sq. 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.38 0.48
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
The dependent variables are ad valorem transport costs (columns 1 and 4), ad valorem freight costs
(columns 2 and 5) and ad valorem insurance costs (columns 3 and 6). Constants are included but not
reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B.3 Trade: Robustness Checks
Table B4 presents the following robustness checks, all using the COW den-
ition of conicts: (i) the denition of transit routes is changed to include the
route from Chad to Pointe-Noire (Congo), via Central African Republic and
Democratic Republic of Congo, (ii) the distance from Malawi to Durban is
changed by allowing a route through the Tete region of Mozambique (see
World Bank 1988 for details), (iii) straight lines distances, taken from the
World Bank Trade, Production and Protection Database, are used in place
of sea distances, (iv) small partner economies (with populations less than
one million in 1990) are no longer excluded, (v) a dummy = 1 is included if
country i is a member of the GATT/WTO, (vi) the Sachs-Warner "open-
ness" dummy is included for country i, with data taken from Wacziarg and
Welch (2008).
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Table B4: Trade and conict, robustness checks (1975-2005)
(1)
ln(trade)
(2)
ln(trade)
(3)
ln(trade)
(4)
ln(trade)
(5)
ln(trade)
(6)
ln(trade)
T 0.029 0.036 0.017 0.018 0.034 0.040
(0.074) (0.081) (0.076) (0.078) (0.081) (0.088)
ln(dist) -2.056*** -2.423*** -1.642*** -2.574*** -2.036** -1.402**
(0.788) (0.916) (0.567) (0.769) (0.797) (0.690)
ln(Yit) -0.024 -0.028 0.025 0.045 -0.038 -0.075
(0.115) (0.115) (0.106) (0.107) (0.117) (0.118)
ln(Yjt) 0.391*** 0.388*** 0.275** 0.277** 0.394*** 0.315**
(0.132) (0.132) (0.121) (0.124) (0.131) (0.144)
Conflict -0.268*** -0.279*** -0.297*** -0.269*** -0.276*** -0.302***
(0.086) (0.085) (0.084) (0.085) (0.086) (0.092)
Conflict+1 -0.449*** -0.448*** -0.376*** -0.388*** -0.457*** -0.443***
(0.090) (0.089) (0.085) (0.087) (0.089) (0.099)
WTOit 0.074
(0.146)
Openit -0.001
(0.117)
Obs. 21,404 21,413 26,109 24,977 21,419 16,878
Pairs 1,046 1,047 1,413 1,275 1,045 979
R-sq. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Columns 1 and 2 use alternative definitions of transit routes, column 3 uses straight line distances instead of sea and
land distances, column 4 includes partner countries with populations <1 million in 1990, column 5 includes a dummy
for WTO membership of African country i, and column 6 includes the Sachs-Warner openness dummy for African
country i (excludes 2001+ due to data limitations).
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C Chapter 3
C.1 Mathematical appendix
Proposition 1
The derivation follows closely Cambini and Spiegel (2012). Consider
rst the case D < D1. Then '(p;D) = 0,
@p
@D
= 0, so that @Y (D)
@D
= 0.
Consider now the case D1 < D < D2. Then '(p;D) =
 
1  p D
c

and
p(D) = a+(1 b)  c
2
+
 
1  p D
c

T

. This imply that @'

@D
= 1
c
, @'

@p
=  1
c
,
and @p

@D
= (1  b)T 1
c
. Using the fact that
@Y (D)
@D
=
@p
@D
 

@'(p(D); D)
@p
@p(D)
@D
+
@'(p(D); D)
@D

(27)
straightforward computations lead to
@Y (D)
@D
=
1
c

(1  b)T
c
  b

(28)
Thus @Y (D)
@D
> 0 if T
c
> b
(1 b) . In this case, which occurs if b is small
enough, the rm chooses D = D2 for which its prot is maximum, while
for @Y (D)
@D
< 0, the rms prot is maximized at D = D1.
Finally, whenD > D2, '(p;D) = 1, p(D) = a+(1 b)

c
2
+ T

, so that
@p
@D
= @

@D
= @

@p
= @(D)
@D
= 0.
Proposition 2
If RE 6= RD equation (28) becomes:
@Y (D)
@D
=
1
c

(1  b)T
c
  b

+RE  RD (29)
and denoting T
c
 z we have that @Y (D)
@D
> 0 if b < z (RD RE)=z
1+z
.
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C.2 Data and regulation details
Table C1: Variable denitions and sources
Variable Sources
Leverage: Total liabilities/ total assets. “Financial sources”: OSITRAN; Agencia
Nacional de Infraestructura (ANI); ISI
Emerging Markets Database; Orbis
Database.
Return on Assets (ROA): EBIT/ total assets. Financial sources.
Volatility: Standard deviation of ROA. Financial sources.
Price cap: Dummy variable indicating whether the contract is price
cap.
Project contracts; bidding documentation;
renegotiation agreements available from
the regulatory agencies.
Renegotiation: Dummy variable indicating whether there was a
renegotiation of the concession contract.
Regulatory agencies; Guasch (2004);
Engel et al. (2009).
Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA): Dummy variable indicating
whether the regulator is independent of the sector Ministry.
Country legislation; Guasch (2004);
Correa et al. (2006); Serebrisky (2012)
Investment: Natural logarithm of investment commitments, in
constant $2000 (millions).
World Bank/PPIAF Private Participation
in Infrastructure (PPI) database; World
Bank World Development Indicators.
Contract duration: Duration of concession contract in years. Project contracts.
Minimum income guarantee: Dummy variable indicating whether
there is a minimum income guarantee from the government.
Project contracts; renegotiation
agreements.
Flexible contract: Dummy variable indicating whether the contract
length is flexible.
Project contracts; renegotiation
agreements.
Multilateral support: Dummy variable indicating whether the
project received financial assistance from the World Bank, Inter-
American Development Bank, International Financial Corporation
or Corporacion Andina de Fomento.
PPI database.
GDP growth: Annual GDP growth in $2000. World Bank World Development
Indicators.
Inflation: Annual inflation (GDP deflator). World Bank World Development
Indicators.
Interest: Lending interest rate IMF International Financial Statistics.
Spread: Interest rate spread. Lending interest rate minus deposit
interest rate.
IMF International Financial Statistics.
Stock market value: Total shares traded on the stock market
exchange/ GDP.
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000)
Financial Development and Structure
Dataset (September 2012 update).
Bond capitalization: Private domestic debt securities issued by
financial institutions and  corporations/ GDP.
Financial Development and Structure
Dataset.
Corruption: Government corruption. Range from 1 to 6. Higher
value means less corruption.
Political Risk Service, International
Country Risk Guide.
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Table C2: Regulation summary
Country Sector Regulator Projects Revision < 5
years
(Y/N)
Inflation/ER
adjustment
(Y/N)
Adjustment
frequency
(Years)
Brazil Road DNER/
ANTT
“First phase”
federal projects
Y Y 1
Brazil Road ANTT “Second
phase” federal
projects
Y Y 1
Brazil Road DER Parana All N Y 1
Brazil Road DAER (Rio
Grande do Sul)
All N Y 1
Brazil Rail RFFSA/
ANTT
Federal freight
concessions
N Y 1
Brazil Rail ASEP RJ/
AGE
TRANSP
Rio metro N Y 1
Brazil Rail ASEP RJ/
AGE
TRANSP
SuperVia N N .
Chile Road MOP All N Y =1
Chile Air MOP All N Y 0.5
Col Road Invias/ INCO All N Y =1
Col Rail Invias/ INCO Federal freight
concessions
N Y 1
Col Air Aerocivil All N Y =1
Col Port MOT/INCO All Y N .
Peru Road OSITRAN All N Y 0.5
Peru Rail OSITRAN All N Y 1
Peru Air OSITRAN Co-pay
contracts
N Y 1
Peru Air OSITRAN RPI-X
contracts
N Y 1
Peru Port OSITRAN All N Y 1
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C.3 Renegotiation: probit results
Table C3 presents the results of running random e¤ects probit regressions
for the probability of contract renegotiation following Guasch et al. (2007).
Table C3: Determinants of renegotiation - probit estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leverage 0.228 0.245
(0.231) (0.237)
Distress -0.040 0.005
(0.065) (0.054)
Performance 0.165 0.181
(0.124) (0.131)
Guasch et al (2007) controls
Project age -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.056***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018)
Price cap 0.823 1.100* 0.878 0.774 1.035* 0.824
(0.641) (0.606) (0.637) (0.656) (0.619) (0.659)
Bureaucratic
quality
-0.185 -0.100 -0.021 -0.413*** -0.323*** -0.286
(0.279) (0.234) (0.249) (0.121) (0.119) (0.196)
Election (-1) -0.158 -0.155 -0.122 -0.154 -0.150 -0.117
(0.113) (0.120) (0.112) (0.115) (0.120) (0.113)
GDP growth (-1) -0.031** -0.038** -0.033* -0.032* -0.039** -0.034*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Sector dummies
Road -0.168 0.122 -0.084 -0.144 0.147 -0.055
(0.739) (0.616) (0.722) (0.747) (0.631) (0.740)
Rail -0.454 -0.168 -0.333 -0.401 -0.099 -0.272
(0.605) (0.494) (0.640) (0.601) (0.493) (0.647)
Air -0.660 -0.400 -0.614 -0.651 -0.389 -0.608
(0.862) (0.739) (0.873) (0.872) (0.756) (0.900)
Country dummies
Brazil -0.935*** -0.840*** -0.880***
(0.083) (0.033) (0.027)
Chile 0.110 0.051 0.063
(0.180) (0.167) (0.285)
Peru -0.253* -0.165 -0.242
(0.147) (0.141) (0.170)
Observations 981 946 878 981 946 878
Log-likelihood -483.29 -458.97 -421.55 -475.85 -452.26 -414.77
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if project i was renegotiated in year t. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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